# 1NC

## 1

#### The plan provides incentives for turbines that won’t be built until the end of the year

#### Should is immediate

Summers, 94

(Justice-Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 11/8, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant,” online: http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14

\*\*\*TO FOOTNOTES

In praesenti means **literally "at the present time**." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

\*\*\*END FOOTNOTES

The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record. Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.19 True minutes20 of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State.

#### That means the plan does nothing – presumption

#### Independently future fiat kills negative strategy and undermines research

#### Uniquely worse cause they say necessary PTC’s which is vague and fiats solvency, kills policy scrutiny

## 2

#### Increase means to make greater

Dictionary.com

**in·crease**   [v. in-krees; n. in-krees] Show IPA verb, in·creased, in·creas·ing, noun

verb (used with object)

1.

**to make greater**, **as in number**, size, strength, or quality; augment; add to: to increase taxes.

#### The aff must add to the number of incentive*s*, not just extend them

LinguaLinks, 3

(Ed. Eugene Loos-International Linguistic Consultant with the Summer Institute of Linguistics. Ph. D.-UT Austin, <http://www.sil.org/LINGUISTICS/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatIsACountNoun.htm>)

**A count noun is a noun whose possible referents are thought of as separate entities**.
**It** thus **has the ability**
\* **to take a plural form**
\* to occur with distinctive determiners (such as a/an, many), and
\* to occur with cardinal numerals.
It does not have the ability, however, to occur with a determiner such as much.

#### “Substantial” excludes potential future increases

Words and Phrases ‘64

(40W&P 759)

The words" outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean **not concealed**; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain: absolute: real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to fonn; actually existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

#### The plan does not increase incentives – it prolongs a current incentive

#### Vote neg:

#### Ground – the topic’s core controversy comes when the aff defends change – they endorse the status quo

#### Limits – any current incentive can be prolonged. Even worse, the absence of any restriction can be prolonged – this category is unlimited hypotheticals

#### Precision – “incentives” is a count noun – extending one doesn’t increase the count

## 3

#### Fiscal cliff negotiations will succeed now, but pre-election groundwork key

Jonathan Weisman, NYTimes, 10/1/12, Leaders at Work on Plan to Avert Mandatory Cuts, www.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/us/senate-leaders-at-work-on-plan-to-avert-fiscal-cliff.html?\_r=2&hp&&pagewanted=all

Senate leaders are closing in on a path for dealing with the “fiscal cliff” facing the country in January, opting to try to use a postelection session of Congress to reach agreement on a comprehensive deficit reduction deal rather than a short-term solution.

Senate Democrats and Republicans remain far apart on the details, and House Republicans continue to resist any discussion of tax increases. But lawmakers and aides say that a bipartisan group of senators is coalescing around an ambitious three-step process to avert a series of automatic tax increases and deep spending cuts.

#### PTC extension unpopular

Styles, 12

(8/2, Managing Director of GSW Strategy Group, “Last Hurrah for the Wind Power Tax Credit?” http://theenergycollective.com/node/99336)

As the Reuters article makes clear, there will be other opportunities for the PTC to be reinserted in the extenders bill or other legislation. However, by persistently arguing for extending the existing credit without modification, the wind industry and its supporters may be misreading the public's appetite for such generous subsidies in a period of protracted economic weakness, notwithstanding the recent Iowa poll. Despite its rapid recent growth wind still contributes less than 4% of the nation's electricity and just 1% of our total energy consumption, and the green jobs angle is wearing thin. Last year's expiration of the ethanol blenders credit set a precedent for ending another large, generous subsidy before its beneficiaries agreed they were done with it. If congressional Republicans line up behind their party's standard beareron this issue, the wind industry will have missed its opportunity for a graduated, multi-year phaseout of the PTC, instead of stepping off a cliff in 2013.

#### Presidential leadership is key to a compromise – the alternative is the collapse of hegemony, a double-dip recession, and war in the Middle East

Hutchison, U.S. Senator from the great state of Texas, 9/21/2012

(Kay Bailey, “A Looming Threat to National Security,” States News Service, Lexis)

Despite warnings of the **dire consequences**, **America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff**, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, **unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement** on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk.

According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and **a** potentially **catastrophic blow to our** national defense and **security capabilities** in a time of increasing violence and danger.

All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve.

The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship.

Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. **Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year**.

The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. **We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings**. **In the absence of U.S. military leadership**, **upheaval in the Middle East would be worse**. **As any student of history can attest**, **instability does not confine itself to national borders**. **Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region**.

Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, **a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological** research, development and **advantage** - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities.

Sequestration can still be avoided. **But that will require** leadership from the President that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

#### Middle East goes nuclear

James A. **Russell,** Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

## 4

#### Obama win now by a decisive, but narrow margin

Mark Blumenthal, HuffPo, 10/1/12, New 2012 Polls Show Little Change In State Of Race , www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/01/2012-polls-obama-romney\_n\_1928472.html?utm\_hp\_ref=elections-2012

With attention turning to the first of three upcoming national debates, new polls show President Barack Obama continuing to hold a narrow lead over Republican nominee Mitt Romney, both nationwide and in the key battleground states that are likely to decide the election.

Two new national surveys released on Monday morning both show a slightly closer race than most other recent polls, although those new results are consistent with previous surveys from the same organizations, indicating that Obama's September lead is holding.

The new Washington Post/ABC News survey finds Obama leading by just 2 percentage points nationwide (49 percent to 47 percent) among the voters deemed most likely to vote. But that result was no different than their previous survey, taken just after the Democratic convention three weeks ago, which showed Obama with a 1-point edge (49 percent to 48 percent).

However, among all registered voters nationwide, the new Post/ABC poll shows Obama leading by 5 percentage points (49 percent to 44 percent), again the same margin as their survey found three weeks ago. The Post also reports that Obama's lead over Romney is larger (52 percent to 41 percent) among a subset of likely voters in swing states.

Similarly, a new Politico/George Washington University Battleground poll also finds Obama leading by 2 percentage points among likely voters (49 percent to 47 percent), a finding essentially unchanged from the 3-point Obama margin (50 percent to 47 percent) found in their previous survey.

The four results have been collectively more favorable to Romney than those produced by other recent national polls, and more importantly, they have shown no statistically meaningful trend in September. The HuffPost Pollster tracking model, which draws on all national and state-level polling and corrects for consistent "house effect" differences among pollsters, continues to give Obama a slightly larger, 4 percentage point lead over Romney.

Similarly, a handful of new statewide surveys released over the weekend shows results consistent with a 3- to 4-point Obama lead nationwide.

In Iowa, a new Des Moines Register Iowa poll found Obama leading by 4 percentage points (49 percent to 45 percent), exactly the same margin as the Pollster tracking model.

In Ohio, an automated recorded-voice survey by the Democratic-affiliated firm Public Policy Polling gives Obama a 4 percentage point advantage, while a new Columbus Dispatch mail-in survey gives Obama a 9-point lead. Not surprisingly, Obama's lead on the Pollster tracking model falls somewhere in between.

Finally, another new PPP poll from North Carolina shows a dead-even race, with each candidate at 48 percent -- again, consistent with a similarly close margin on HuffPost's tracking model. North Carolina has been the closest of the 50 states over the last three weeks.

Thus, the combination of national and statewide polling continues to show Obama leading Romney by statistically meaningful margins in all of the battleground states except North Carolina. Were he to carry all of the states where he is currently leading, Obama would win 332 electoral votes -- far more than the 270 needed to win. Romney currently leads in states accounting for 191 electoral votes.

Can Wednesday night's nationally televised debates between Obama and Romney, the first of three to be held between now and late October, be a "game changer" for Romney? Not likely, according to George Washington University political scientist John Sides.

"When it comes to shifting enough votes to decide the outcome of the election," Sides writes in the Washington Monthly, "presidential debates have rarely, if ever, mattered."

Sides cites research by political scientists Robert Erikson and Christopher Wlezien, who studied polling from every election from 1952 to 2008 and found that while debates sometimes nudge results, they rarely produce substantial changes in voter preferences. Erikson and Wlezien found that since 1960, the leader in the polling before the debates remained the leader after the debates.

The most significant before-and-after debate shift was toward Gerald Ford in his 1976 race against Jimmy Carter. However, as Erikson and Wlezien note, "Carter's support was in steady decline" during the final month of the race.

It is worth remembering that while Obama enjoys a statistically meaningful lead in national polling, his margin remains relatively modest compared to past elections. So while a "nudge" toward Romney on the order of what debates produced in 1980, 2000 or 2004 might not be enough to move Romney ahead, it could make for a much closer race.

Additional renewables spending draws attention to Solyndra

Sandoval, 7-27

Michael Sandoval, an investigative reporter with The Heritage Foundation, 7-27-2012, “Abound Solar: Doomed to Fail Because of Election-Year Politics, Investor Says,” http://blog.heritage.org/2012/07/27/abound-solar-doomed-to-fail-because-of-election-year-politics-investor-says/

“After Solyndra, the Department of Energy was balking and not releasing any more money under the loan guarantee because they didn’t want to be embarrassed in an election year,” he told MarketWatch.

Hill met with Colorado Democrats like Gov. John Hickenlooper and Sen. Michael Bennet, but could not prevail upon them to act.

“None of these guys would touch it. They said ‘Solyndra is a poisonous issue,’” according to Hill.

The Department of Energy, which had granted Abound its $400 million loan guarantee, suddenly began to enforce many of the stringent benchmarks that precluded access to drawing down additional loan funds, something it only did in the wake of the Solyndra news, Hill said.

Solyndra secures undecided, disillusioned voters for Romney

Restuccia et al., 9-6

Andrew Restuccia, Darren Samuelsohn, Darren Goode, staff writer, Politico.com, “Who wins Solyndra message war?” lexis

Meanwhile, evidence is scant on how much mileage the Republicans are getting out of all their Solyndra messaging -- though their persistence is a sign that GOP strategists see promise there. And conservative groups have certainly spent big bucks promoting the message.

Luke Frans, executive director of the GOP-aligned polling firm Resurgent Republic, said the issue hits home when people in focus groups hear about Solyndra's price tag and a version of how the Energy Department approved the company's $535 million loan guarantee. He said it's especially damaging for the president among swing voters.

"Solyndra is an issue that puts President Obama in the context of being just another politician, instead of the transformative, post-partisan figure introduced to the electorate in 2008," said Frans, a former George W. Bush White House aide.

"If you're a disillusioned Obama voter, this is an issue that reminds you why you're disillusioned," he added.

But Frans acknowledged that Solyndra is not the top issue going into November. "It's not going to knock the economy off the top of the voting ballot," he said.

Americans for Prosperity President Tim Phillips, whose group has spent at least $13.5 million on ads attacking Solyndra and the Obama stimulus, says the criticisms work best in context with the broader stimulus effort. "Solyndra is just an example," he said.

After hosting focus groups, Phillips said he came away thinking that the goal isn't to get viewers to follow every detail of the Solyndra deal.

"What you're hoping to do is give them a sense of a theme or just one information data point that rings true with something already in their mind, that confirms a broader belief," Phillips said.

Jennifer Duffy, senior editor at the Cook Political Report, agreed that Solyndra doesn't work as a standalone issue. "Instead it's a symptom of what Republicans call 'Obama's failed economic policy.' It is one concrete example for voters that the stimulus/loan guarantees didn't work," she said.

Romney aides say they have Republican National Committee testing that shows the Solyndra attacks work when boiled down to a one- to two-sentence message about the money lost and the company's connections to Obama donors.

"It was the single, No. 1 most potent hit" among about 25 messages, including the growing national debt and a lack of "shovel ready job projects," a Romney aide said. "It even beat health care."

Romney pollster Neil Newhouse, partner and co-founder of Public Opinion Strategies, said Solyndra represents "the poster child for wasted stimulus money. Americans thought it would go to job creation and it was essentially flushed down the toilet."\

#### Romney win causes China-bashing – causes a trade war

Gerstein 11

(Josh, writer @ Politico, “The GOP's China syndrome”, 11/22/12, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/68952.html)

Mitt Romney says America is at war with China — a “trade war” over its undervalued currency. “They’re stealing our jobs. And we’re gonna stand up to China,” the former Massachusetts governor declared in a recent Republican presidential debate, arguing that the United States should threaten to impose tariffs on Chinese imports. When Romney steps on stage tonight for another debate, this one devoted to foreign policy, that kind of China-bashing is likely to be a favorite theme. With a moribund economy and relatively little traction for other international issues, the threat posed by cheap Chinese imports and Chinese purchases of U.S. debt is an irresistible target. The problem, China experts are quick to point out, is that those attacks often fly in the face of the business interests Republicans have traditionally represented, not to mention the record many of the candidates have either supporting trade with China — or actively soliciting it. Just last year, for example, Romney slammed President Barack Obama for growth-killing protectionism after he put a 35 percent tariff on Chinese tires because of a surge of cheap imports. And, Romney wrote in his book, “No Apology: The Case for American Greatness,” “Protectionism stifles productivity.” And though Texas Gov. Rick Perry predicted at a debate this month that “the Chinese government will end up on the ash heap of history if they do not change their virtues,” a picture posted on the Internet shows a smiling Perry on a trade mission to Shanghai and Beijing posing with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi after presenting him with a pair of cowboy boots. Nor has Perry been shy about encouraging Chinese investments in Texas: In October 2010, he appeared at the announcement of a new U.S. headquarters for Huawei Technologies to be located in Plano, Texas, despite lingering concerns among U.S. security officials that Huawei-made telecommunications equipment is designed to allow unauthorized access by the Chinese government. “There’s a certain pandering going on,” said Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who adds that the GOP rhetoric is squarely at odds with the views of the U.S. establishment, which believes a showdown with China over the trade issue “will make things worse, not better.” Not all of the 2012 GOP presidential hopefuls have taken to publicly pummeling Beijing. The only bona fide China expert in the group, former Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman, has criticized Romney for being cavalier and simplistic in his talk of tariffs. “You can give applause lines, and you can kind of pander here and there. You start a trade war if you start slapping tariffs randomly on Chinese products based on currency manipulation,” Huntsman said at a recent debate. “That doesn’t work.” Former Sen. Rick Santorum also rejected the idea of slapping tariffs on Beijing if it won’t buckle on the currency issue. “That just taxes you. I don’t want to tax you,” Santorum said. Newt Gingrich says he wants to bring a world of hurt down on Beijing for alleged Chinese cyberattacks on the U.S. and theft of intellectual property, though he’s vague about how. “We’re going to have to find ways to dramatically raise the pain level for the Chinese cheating,” the former house speaker declares. And Herman Cain talks of a threat from China, but says the answer is to promote growth in the U.S. “China’s economic dominance would represent a national security threat to the USA, and possibly to the rest of the world,” Cain wrote in May in the Daily Caller. “We can outgrow China because the USA is not a loser nation. We just need a winner in the White House.” Romney’s rhetoric has been particularly harsh. “It’s predatory pricing, it’s killing jobs in America,” he declared at the CNBC debate earlier this month, promising to make a formal complaint to the World Trade Organization about China’s currency manipulation. “I would apply, if necessary, tariffs to make sure that they understand we are willing to play at a level playing field.” The Romney campaign insists those tariffs are entirely distinguishable from the tire duties Obama imposed in 2009. “The distinction between Obama’s tire action and what Gov. Romney is proposing is simple,” said a Romney aide who did not want to be named. “President Obama is not getting tough with China or pushing them unilaterally, he is handing out political favors to union allies. [Romney’s] policy focuses on fostering competition by keeping markets open and the playing field level.” Romney, who helped set up investment bank Bain Capital, has long been a favorite of Wall Street, so his stridency on the China trade issue has taken some traditional conservatives — for whom free trade is a fundamental tenet — by surprise. National Review said Romney’s move “risk[ed] a trade war with China” and was “a remarkably bad idea.” In fact, many business leaders give Obama good marks for his China policy. “What the Obama administration has done in not labeling China as a ‘currency manipulator’ is correct,” said one U.S. business lobbyist who closely follows U.S.-China trade issues and asked not to be named. “We’re very leery of a tit-for-tat situation,” he added, while acknowledging that the anti-China rhetoric is “good politics.”

#### That goes nuclear

Taaffe 5

(Peter Taaffe, general secretary of the Socialist Party of England and Wales, “China, A New Superpower?,” Socialist Alternative.org, Nov 1, 2005, pg. <http://www.socialistalternative.org/news/article11.php?id=30>)

While this conflict is unresolved, the shadow of a trade war looms. Some commentators, like Henry C.K. Liu in the Asia Times, go further and warn that "trade wars can lead to shooting wars." China is not the Japan of the 21st century. Japan in the 1980s relied on the U.S. military and particularly its nuclear umbrella against China, and was therefore subject to the pressure and blackmail of the U.S. ruling class. The fear of the U.S., and the capitalists of the "first world" as a whole, is that China may in time "out-compete" the advanced nations for hi-tech jobs while holding on to the stranglehold it now seems to have in labor-intensive industries. As the OECD commented recently: "In the five-year period to 2003, the number of students joining higher education courses has risen by three and a half times, with a strong emphasis on technical subjects." The number of patents and engineers produced by China has also significantly grown. At the same time, an increasingly capitalist China - most wealth is now produced in the private sector but the majority of the urban labor force is still in state industries - and the urgency for greater energy resources in particular to maintain its spectacular growth rate has brought it into collision on a world scale with other imperialist powers, particularly the U.S. In a new worldwide version of the "Great Game" - the clash for control of central Asia's resources in the nineteenth century - the U.S. and China have increasingly come up against and buffeted one another. Up to now, the U.S. has held sway worldwide due to its economic dominance buttressed by a colossal war machine accounting for 47% of total world arms spending. But Iraq has dramatically shown the limits of this: "A country that cannot control Iraq can hardly remake the globe on its own." (Financial Times) But no privileged group disappears from the scene of history without a struggle. Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. defense secretary, has stated: "Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: why this growing [arms] investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases?" China could ask the same question of the U.S. In order to maintain its position, the U.S. keeps six nuclear battle fleets permanently at sea, supported by an unparalleled network of bases. As Will Hutton in The Observer has commented, this is not because of "irrational chauvinism or the needs of the military-industrial complex, but because of the pressure they place on upstart countries like China." In turn, the Chinese elite has responded in kind. For instance, in the continuing clash over Taiwan, a major-general in the People's Liberation Army baldly stated that if China was attacked "by Washington during a confrontation over Taiwan... I think we would have to respond with nuclear weapons." He added: "We Chinese will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all of the cities east of Xian. Of course, the Americans would have to be prepared that hundreds... of cities would be destroyed by the Chinese." This bellicose nuclear arms rattling shows the contempt of the so-called great powers for the ordinary working-class and peasant peoples of China and the people of the U.S. when their interests are at stake.

## 5

#### Wind’s a band-aid that props up consumption

Zehner 12

Green illusions,

Ozzie Zehner is the author of Green Illusions and a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley. His recent publications include public science pieces in Christian Science Monitor, The American Scholar, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, The Humanist, The Futurist, and Women’s Studies Quarterly. He has appeared on PBS, BBC, CNN, MSNBC, and regularly guest lectures at universities. Zehner’s research and projects have been covered by The Sunday Times, USA Today, WIRED, The Washington Post, Business Week and numerous other media outlets. He also serves on the editorial board of Critical Environmentalism.

Zehner primarily researches the social, political and economic conditions influencing energy policy priorities and project outcomes. His work also incorporates symbolic roles that energy technologies play within political and environmental movements. His other research interests include consumerism, urban policy, environmental governance, international human rights, and forgeries.

Zehner attended Kettering University (BS -Engineering) and The University of Amsterdam (MS/Drs – Science and Technology Studies). His research was awarded with honors at both institutions. He lives in San Francisco.

If environmentalists suspected anything funny about the 20% Wind Energy by 2030 report, they didn't say anything about it in public. Instead, fifty environmental groups and research institutes, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory opted to double-down their windy bets by formally backing the study. When the nation's smartest and most dedicated research scientists, physicists, and environmentalists roll over to look up googly-eyed at any corporate energy production report, it's worthy of our attention. This love affair, however, is harmful to the environmentalists' cause for a number of reasons. First, fetishizing overly optimistic expectations for wind power takes attention away from another grave concern of environmental groups—reducing dirty coal use. Even if the United States could attain 20 percent wind energy by 2030, the achievement alone might not remove a single fossil-fuel plant from the grid. There is a common misconception that building additional alternative-energy capacity will displace fossil-fuel use; however, over past years, this hasn't been the case. Producing more energy simply increases supply, lowers cost, and stimulates additional energy consumption. Incidentally, some analysts argue that the mass deployment of wind turbines in Europe has not decreased the region's carbon footprint by even a single gram. They point to Spain, which prided itself on being a solar and wind power leader over the last two decades only to see its greenhouse gas emissions rise 40 percent over the same period. Second, the pomp and circumstance around wind diverts attention from competing solutions that possess promising social and ecological value. In a cash-strapped economy, we have to consider the trade-offs. As journalist Anselm Waldermann points out, "when it comes to climate change, investments in wind and solar energy are not very efficient. Preventing one ton of co2 emissions requires a relatively large amount of money. Other measures, especially building renovations, cost much less—and have the same effect."45

The third problem is the problem with all myths. When they don't come true, people grow cynical. Inflated projections today endanger the very legitimacy of the environmental movement tomorrow. Every energy-production technology carries its own yoke of drawbacks and limitations. However, the allure of a magical silver bullet can bring harms one step closer. Illusory diversions act to prop up and stabilize a system of extreme energy consumption and waste. Hype surrounding wind energy might even shield the fossil-fuel establishment—if clean and abundant energy is just over the horizon, then there is less motivation to clean up existing energy production or use energy more wisely. It doesn't help when the government maintains two ledgers of incompatible expectations. One set, based on fieldwork and historical trends, is used internally by people in the know. The second set, crafted from industry speculation and "unconstrained" by history, is disseminated via press releases, websites, and even by the president himself to an unwitting public. It may be time for mainstream environmental organizations to take note of this incongruence, put away the clean energy pom-poms, and get back to work speaking up for global ecosystems, which are hurt, not helped, by additional energy production. Because as we shall see, the United States doesn't have an energy crisis. It has a consumption crisis. Flashy diversions created through the disingenuous grandstanding of alternative-energy mechanisms act to obscure this simple reality.

#### The system’s nsustainable – debt, offshoring, financialization, eco – only shift from EMPIRE to MULTITUDES averts extinction

Shor 10

<http://www.stateofnature.org/locatingTheContemporary.html>

Fran Shor teaches in the History Department at Wayne State University. He is the author of Dying Empire: US Imperialism and Global Resistance (Routledge 2010).

Attributing the debilitation of the U.S. economy to a mortgage crisis or the collapse of the housing market misses the truly epochal crisis in the world economy and, indeed, in capitalism itself. As economist Michael Hudson contends, "the financial 'wealth creation' game is over. Economies emerged from World War II relatively free of debt, but the 60-year global run-up has run its course. Financial capitalism is in a state of collapse, and marginal palliatives cannot revive it." According to Hudson, among those palliatives is an ironic variant of the IMF strategies imposed on developing nations. "The new twist is a variant on the IMF 'stabilization' plans that lend money to central banks to support their currencies - for long enough to enable local oligarchs and foreign investors to move their savings and investments offshore at a good exchange rate." The continuity between these IMF plans and even the Obama administration's fealty to Wall Street can be seen in the person of Lawrence Summers, now the chief economic advisor to Obama. As further noted by Hudson, "the Obama bank bailout is arranged much like an IMF loan to support the exchange rate of foreign currency, but with the Treasury supporting financial asset prices for U.S. banks and other financial institutions ... Private-sector debt will be moved onto the U.S. Government balance sheet, where "taxpayers" will bear losses." [4] So, here we have another variation of the working poor getting sapped by the economic elite! In fact, one estimate of U.S. federal government support to the elite financial institutions is in the range of $10 trillion dollars, a heist of unimaginable proportions. [5] Given the massive indebtedness of the United States, its reliance of foreign support of that debt by countries like China, which has close to $2 trillion tied up in treasury bills and other investments, a long-term crisis of profitability, overproduction, and offshoring of essential manufacturing, it does not appear that the United States and, perhaps, even the capitalist system can avoid collapse. Certainly, there are Marxist economists and world-systems analysts who are convinced that the collapse is inevitable, albeit it may take several generations to complete. The question becomes whether a dying system can be resuscitated or, if something else can be put in its place. One of the most prominent world systems scholars, Immanuel Wallerstein, puts the long-term crisis of capitalism and the alternatives in the following perspective: Because the system we have known for 500 years is no longer able to guarantee long-term prospects of capital accumulation, we have entered a period of world chaos. Wild (and largely uncontrollable) swings in the economic, political, and military situations are leading to a systemic bifurcation, that is, to a world collective choice about the kind of new system the world will construct over the next fifty years. The new system will not be a capitalist system, but it could be one of two kinds: a different system that is equally or more hierarchical and inequalitarian, or one that is substantially democratic and equalitarian. [6] What Wallerstein overlooks is the possibility that a global crisis of capitalism with its continuous overexploitation and maldistribution of essential resources, such as water, could lead to a planetary catastrophe. [7] While Wallerstein and many of the Marxist critics of capitalism correctly identify the long-term structural crisis of capitalism and offer important insights into the need for more democratic and equalitarian systems, they often fail to realize other critical predicaments that have plagued human societies in the past and persist in even more life-threatening ways today. Among those predicaments are the power trips of civilization and environmental destructiveness. Such power trips can be seen through the sedimentation of power-over in the reign of patriarchal systems and an evolutionary selection for that power-over which contaminates society and social relationships. Certainly, many of those predicaments can also be attributed to a 5000 year history of the intersection of empire and civilization. Anthropologist Kajsa Ekholm Friedman analyzes that intersection and its impact in the Bronze Age as an "imperialist project..., dependent upon trade and ultimately upon war." [8] However, over the long rule of empire and especially within the last 500 years of the global aspirations of various empires, "no state or empire," observes historian Eric Hobsbawm, "has been large, rich, or powerful enough to maintain hegemony over the political world, let alone to establish political and military supremacy over the globe." [9] While war and trade still remain key components of the imperial project today and pretensions for global supremacy persist in the United States, what is just as threatening to the world as we know it is the overexploitation and abuse of environmental resources. Jared Diamond brilliantly reveals how habituated attitudes and values precluded the necessary recognition of environmental degradation which, in turn, led to the collapse of vastly different civilizations, societies, and cultures throughout recorded history. [10] He identifies twelve contemporary environmental challenges which pose grave dangers to the planet and its inhabitants. Among these are the destruction of natural habitats (rainforests, wetlands, etc.); species extinction; soil erosion; depletion of fossil fuels and underground water aquifers; toxic pollution; and climate change, especially attributable to the use of fossil fuels. [11] U.S. economic imperialism has played a direct role in environmental degradation, whether in McDonald's resource destruction of rainforests in Latin America, Coca-Cola's exploitation of underground water aquifers in India, or Union Carbide's toxic pollution in India. Beyond the links between empire and environmental destruction, unless we also clearly understand and combat the connections between empire and unending growth with its attendant "accumulation by dispossession", we may very well doom ourselves to extinction. According to James Gustave Speth, Dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, the macro obsession with growth is also intimately related to our micro habituated ways of living. "Parallel to transcending our growth fetish," Speth argues, "we must move beyond our consumerism and hyperventilating lifestyles ... This reluctance to challenge consumption has been a big mistake, given the mounting environmental and social costs of American "affluenza," extravagance and wastefulness." [12] Of course, there are significant class and ethnic/racial differences in consumerism and lifestyle in the United States. However, even more vast differences and inequities obtain between the U.S. and the developing world. It is those inequities that lead Eduardo Galeano to conclude that "consumer society is a booby trap. Those at the controls feign ignorance, but anybody with eyes in his head can see that the great majority of people necessarily must consume not much, very little, or nothing at all in order to save the bit of nature we have left." [13] Finally, from Vandana Shiva's perspective, "unless worldviews and lifestyles are restructured ecologically, peace and justice will continue to be violated and, ultimately, the very survival of humanity will be threatened." [14] For Shiva and other global agents of resistance, the ecological and peace and justice imperatives require us to act in the here and now. Her vision of "Earth Democracy" with its emphasis on balancing authentic needs with a local ecology provides an essential guidepost to what we all can do to stop the ravaging of the environment and to salvage the planet. As she insists, "Earth Democracy is not just about the next protest or next World Social Forum; it is about what we do in between. It addresses the global in our everyday lives, our everyday realities, and creates change globally by making change locally." [15] The local, national, and transnational struggles and visions of change are further evidence that the imperial project is not only being contested but also being transformed on a daily basis. According to Mark Engler, "The powerful will abandon their strategies of control only when it grows too costly for them to do otherwise. It is the concerted efforts of people coming together in local communities and in movements spanning borders that will raise the costs. Empire becomes unsustainable ... when the people of the world resist." [16] Whether in the rural villages of Brazil or India, the jungles of Mexico or Ecuador, the city squares of Cochabama or Genoa, the streets of Seattle or Soweto, there has been, and continues to be, resistance around the globe to the imperial project. If the ruling elite and many of the citizens of the United States have not yet accepted the fact that the empire is dying and with it the concentric circles of economic, political, environmental, and civilizational crises, the global multitudes have been busy at work, digging its future grave and planting the seeds for another possible world. [17]

#### Rejec the aff’s neoliberal ideology – critique of broad structures is better than techno-productionist fixes even if they win some truth claims

Zehner 12

Green illusions,

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Since this book represents a critique of alternative energy, it may seem an unlikely manual for alternative-energy proponents. But it is. Building alternative-energy infrastructure atop America's present economic, social, and cultural landscape is akin to building a sandcastle in a rising tide. A taller sand castle won't help. The first steps in this book sketch a partial blueprint for making alternative-energy technologies relevant into the future. Technological development alone will do little to bring about a durable alternative-energy future. Reimagining the social conditions of energy use will. Ultimately, we have to ask ourselves if environmentalists should be involved in the business of energy production (of any sort) while so many more important issues remain vastly underserved. Over the next several decades, it's quite likely that our power production cocktail will look very much like the mix of today, save for a few adjustments in market share. Wind and biofuel generation will become more prevalent and the stage is set for nuclear power as well, despite recent catastrophes. Nevertheless, these changes will occur over time—they will seem slow. Every power production mechanism has side effects and limitations of its own, and a global shift to new forms of power production simply means that humanity will have to deal with new side effects and limitations in the future. This simple observation seems to have gotten lost in the cheerleading for alternative-energy technologies. The mainstream environmental movement should throw down the green energy pom-poms and pull out the bifocals. It is entirely reasonable for environmentalists to criticize fossil-fuel industries for the harms they instigate. It is, however, entirely unreasonable for environmentalists to become spokespeople for the next round of ecological disaster machines such as solar cells, ethanol, and battery-powered vehicles. Environmentalists pack the largest punch when they instead act as power production watchdogs (regardless of the production method); past environmentalist pressures have cleaned the air and made previously polluted waterways swimmable. This watchdog role will be vital in the future as biofuels, nuclear plants, alternative fossil fuels, solar cells, and other energy technologies import new harms and risks. Beyond a watchdog role, environmentalists yield the greatest progress when addressing our social fundamentals, whether by supporting human rights, cleaning up elections, imagining new economic structures, strengthening communities, revitalizing democracy, or imagining more prosperous modes of consumption. Unsustainable energy use is a symptom of suboptimal social conditions. Energy use will come down when we improve these conditions: consumption patterns that lead to debt and depression; commercials aimed at children; lonely seniors stuck in their homes because they can no longer drive; kids left to fend for themselves when it comes to mobility or sexuality; corporate influence trumping citizen representation; measurements of the nation's health in dollars rather than well-being; a media concerned with advertising over insight, and so on. These may not seem like environmental issues, and they certainly don't seem like energy policy issues, but in reality they are the most important energy and environmental issues of our day. Addressing them won't require sacrifice or social engineering. They are congruent with the interests of many Americans, which will make them easier to initiate and fulfill. They are entirely realistic (as many are already enjoyed by other societies on the planet). They are, in a sense, boring. In fact, the only thing shocking about them is the degree to which they have been underappreciated in contemporary environmental thought, sidelined in the media, and ignored by politicians. Even though these first steps don't represent a grand solution, they are necessary preconditions if we intend to democratically design and implement more comprehensive solutions in the future. Ultimately, clean energy is less energy. Alternative-energy alchemy has so greatly consumed the public imagination over recent decades that the most vital and durable environmental essentials remain overlooked and underfunded. Today energy executives hiss silver-tongued fairy tales about clean-coal technologies, safe nuclear reactors, and renewable sources such as solar, wind, and biofuels to quench growing energy demands, fostering the illusion that we can maintain our expanding patterns of energy consumption without consequence. At the same time, they claim that these technologies can be made environmentally, socially, and politically sound while ignoring a history that has repeatedly shown otherwise. If we give in to accepting their conceptual frames, such as those pitting production versus production, or if we parrot their terms such as clean coal, bridge fuels, peacetime atom, smart growth, and clean energy, then we have already lost. We forfeit our right to critical democratic engagement and instead allow the powers that be to regurgitate their own terms of debate into our open upstretched mouths. Alternative-energy technologies don't clean the air. They don't clean the water. They don't protect wildlife. They don't support human rights. They don't improve neighborhoods. They don't strengthen democracy. They don't regulate themselves. They don't lower atmospheric carbon dioxide. They don't reduce consumption. They produce power. That power can lead to durable benefits, but only given the appropriate context. Ultimately, it's not a question of whether American society possesses the technological prowess to construct an alternative-energy nation. The real question is the reverse. Do we have a society capable of being powered by alternative energy? The answer today is clearly no. But we can change that. Future environmentalists will drop solar, wind, biofuels, nuclear, hydrogen, and hybrids to focus instead on women's rights, consumer culture, walkable neighborhoods, military spending, zoning, health care, wealth disparities, citizen governance, economic reform, and democratic institutions. As environmentalists and global citizens, it's not enough to say that we would benefit by shifting our focus. Our very relevance depends on it.

## warming

Warming won’t cause extinction

Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

CO2 isn’t key

Watts, 25-year climate reporter, works with weather technology, weather stations, and weather data processing systems in the private sector, 7/25/’12

(Anthony, <http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/07/25/lindzen-at-sandia-national-labs-climate-models-are-flawed/>)

ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Richard Lindzen, a global warming skeptic, told about 70 Sandia researchers in June that too much is being made of climate change by researchers seeking government funding. He said their data and their methods did not support their claims.

“Despite concerns over the last decades with the greenhouse process, they oversimplify the effect,” he said. “Simply cranking up CO2 [carbon dioxide] (as the culprit) is not the answer” to what causes climate change.

Lindzen, the ninth speaker in Sandia’s Climate Change and National Security Speaker Series, is Alfred P. Sloan professor of meteorology in MIT’s department of earth, atmospheric and planetary sciences. He has published more than 200 scientific papers and is the lead author of Chapter 7 (“Physical Climate Processes and Feedbacks”) of the International Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Third Assessment Report. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a fellow of the American Geophysical Union and the American Meteorological Society.

For 30 years, climate scientists have been “locked into a simple-minded identification of climate with greenhouse-gas level. … That climate should be the function of a single parameter (like CO2) has always seemed implausible. Yet an obsessive focus on such an obvious oversimplification has likely set back progress by decades,” Lindzen said.

For major climates of the past, other factors were more important than carbon dioxide. Orbital variations have been shown to quantitatively account for the cycles of glaciations of the past 700,000 years, he said, and the elimination of the arctic inversion, when the polar caps were ice-free, “is likely to have been more important than CO2 for the warm episode during the Eocene 50 million years ago.”

There is little evidence that changes in climate are producing extreme weather events, he said. “Even the IPCC says there is little if any evidence of this. In fact, there are important physical reasons for doubting such anticipations.”

Lindzen’s views run counter to those of almost all major professional societies. For example, the American Physical Society statement of Nov. 18, 2007, read, “The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring.” But he doesn’t feel they are necessarily right. “Why did the American Physical Society take a position?” he asked his audience. “Why did they find it compelling? They never answered.”

Speaking methodically with flashes of humor — “I always feel that when the conversation turns to weather, people are bored.” — he said a basic problem with current computer climate models that show disastrous increases in temperature is that relatively small increases in atmospheric gases lead to large changes in temperatures in the models.

But, he said, “predictions based on high (climate) sensitivity ran well ahead of observations.”

Real-world observations do not support IPCC models, he said: “We’ve already seen almost the equivalent of a doubling of CO2 (in radiative forcing) and that has produced very little warming.”

He disparaged proving the worth of models by applying their criteria to the prediction of past climatic events, saying, “The models are no more valuable than answering a test when you have the questions in advance.”

Modelers, he said, merely have used aerosols as a kind of fudge factor to make their models come out right. (Aerosols are tiny particles that reflect sunlight. They are put in the air by industrial or volcanic processes and are considered a possible cause of temperature change at Earth’s surface.)

Then there is the practical question of what can be done about temperature increases even if they are occurring, he said. “China, India, Korea are not going to go along with IPCC recommendations, so … the only countries punished will be those who go along with the recommendations.”

He discounted mainstream opinion that climate change could hurt national security, saying that “historically there is little evidence of natural disasters leading to war, but economic conditions have proven much more serious. Almost all proposed mitigation policies lead to reduced energy availability and higher energy costs. All studies of human benefit and national security perspectives show that increased energy is important.”

He showed a graph that demonstrated that more energy consumption leads to higher literacy rate, lower infant mortality and a lower number of children per woman.

Given that proposed policies are unlikely to significantly influence climate and that lower energy availability could be considered a significant threat to national security, to continue with a mitigation policy that reduces available energy “would, at the least, appear to be irresponsible,” he argued.

Responding to audience questions about rising temperatures, he said a 0.8 of a degree C change in temperature in 150 years is a small change. Questioned about five-, seven-, and 17-year averages that seem to show that Earth’s surface temperature is rising, he said temperatures are always fluctuating by tenths of a degree.

Negative feedbacks stop runaway warming

Singer, PhD physics – Princeton University and professor of environmental science – UVA, consultant – NASA, GAO, DOE, NASA, Carter, PhD paleontology – University of Cambridge, adjunct research professor – Marine Geophysical Laboratory @ James Cook University, and Idso, PhD Geography – ASU, ‘11

(S. Fred, Robert M. and Craig, “Climate Change Reconsidered,” 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental Panel on Climate Change)

According to Lindzen and Choi, all 11 models employed in the IPCC‘s analysis ―agree as to positive feedback,‖ but they find that they all disagree—and disagree ―very sharply‖—with the real-world observations that Lindzen and Choi utilized, which imply that negative feedback actually prevails. Moreover, the presence of that negative feedback reduces the CO2-induced propensity for warming to the extent that their analysis of the real-world observational data yields only a mean SST increase ―of ~0.5°C for a doubling of CO2.‖ How does one decide which of the two results is closer to the truth? Real-world data would be the obvious standard against which to compare model-derived results, but since Lindzen and Choi‘s results are indeed based on real-world measurements, the only alternative we have is to seek other real-world results. Fortunately, there are several such findings, many of which are summarized by in Idso (1998), who describes eight ―natural experiments‖ that he personally employed in prior studies to determine ―how earth‘s near-surface air temperature responds to surface radiative perturbations.‖ The eight natural experiments used by Idso were (1) the change in the air‘s water vapor content that occurs at Phoenix, Arizona with the advent of the summer monsoon, (2) the naturally occurring vertical redistribution of dust that occurs at Phoenix between summer and winter, (3) the annual cycle of surface air temperature caused by the annual cycle of solar radiation absorption at the Earth‘s surface, (4) the warming effect of the entire atmosphere caused by its mean flux of thermal radiation to the surface of the Earth, (5) the annually averaged equator-to-pole air temperature gradient that is sustained by the annually averaged equator-to-pole gradient of total surface-absorbed radiant energy, (6) the mean surface temperatures of Earth, Mars, and Venus relative to the amounts of CO2 contained in their atmospheres, (7) the paradox of the faint early sun and its implications for Earth‘s thermal history, and (8) the greenhouse effect of water vapor over the tropical oceans and its impact on sea surface temperatures. These eight analyses, in the words of Idso, ―suggest that a 300 to 600 ppm doubling of the atmosphere‘s CO2 concentration could raise the planet‘s mean surface air temperature by only about 0.4°C,‖ which is right in line with Lindzen and Choi‘s deduced warming of ~0.5°C for a nominal doubling of the air‘s CO2 content. Hence, there would appear to be strong real-world data that argue against the overinflated CO2-induced global warming predicted by state-of-the-art climate models.

#### Alt energy fails – it only encourages increased productionism

**Zehner 12**

Green illusions,

Ozzie Zehner is the author of Green Illusions and a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley. His recent publications include public science pieces in Christian Science Monitor, The American Scholar, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, The Humanist, The Futurist, and Women’s Studies Quarterly. He has appeared on PBS, BBC, CNN, MSNBC, and regularly guest lectures at universities. Zehner’s research and projects have been covered by The Sunday Times, USA Today, WIRED, The Washington Post, Business Week and numerous other media outlets. He also serves on the editorial board of Critical Environmentalism.

Zehner primarily researches the social, political and economic conditions influencing energy policy priorities and project outcomes. His work also incorporates symbolic roles that energy technologies play within political and environmental movements. His other research interests include consumerism, urban policy, environmental governance, international human rights, and forgeries.

Zehner attended Kettering University (BS -Engineering) and The University of Amsterdam (MS/Drs – Science and Technology Studies). His research was awarded with honors at both institutions. He lives in San Francisco.

If we were gunslingers, we'd be in trouble. Several sinister energy challenges are staring us down, but the productivists are asking us to choose our weapon from a rack of **toy guns**. The alternative-energy project's fundamental weakness lies in its failure to engage with obvious cultural factors such as **consumerism, corporatism, and middle-class desires.** Instead, we allow pundits to frame energy challenges as technological problems requiring a **technological fix.** Every day, media troupes relay news snippets touting the latest bio-eco-green energy sources—all designed to jury-rig a mode of life that is not optimal, desirable, or even affordable for most of the world's communities. The "energy crisis" is more cultural than technological in nature and the failure to recognize this has led to policies that have brought us no closer to an alternative-energy future today than we were in the 1960s when the notion was first envisaged.1 In fact, since the 1960s , humanity has become quite adept at intensifying large-scale risks through a variety of productivist pursuits. We've built neighborhoods deep in forests that are bound to catch on fire, we've built our cities right up to the banks of constricted rivers prone to flooding, we've erected tall buildings atop triggered faults, and so it's really no surprise that we've constructed an energy system pressed right up against the very limits of power production.2 Attempting to push these limits back by creating more power through alternative means is a **futile** endeavor, at least in the current sociopolitical environment of the United States. A growing population insisting on greater affluence will quickly fill any vacancy such maneuvers might pry open. This would not only expand overall energy risks but also increase the number of souls in danger when energy supplies inevitably waver again. This is what I call **the boomerang effect.** Energy Boomerang Effect A central project of this book is to interrogate the assumption that alternative energy is a viable path to prosperity. I have not only outlined the many side effects, drawbacks, risks, and limitations of alternative technologies but have also indicated that we cannot assume that shifting to them will lower our fossil-fuel use. Alternative-energy production expands energy supplies, placing downward pressure on prices, which spurs demand, entrenches energy-intensive modes of living, and finally brings us right back to where we started: high demand and so-called insufficient supply.3 In short, we create an **energy boomerang**—the harder we throw, the harder it will come back to hit us on the head. More efficient solar cells, taller wind turbines, and advanced biofuels are all just ways of throwing harder. Humans have been subject to the flight pattern of this boomerang for quite some time and there is no reason to suppose we have escaped its whirling trajectory today. In the existing American context, increasing alternative-energy production will not displace fossil-fuel side effects but will instead simply add more side effects to the mix (and as we have seen, there are plenty of alternative-energy side effects to be wary of). So instead of a world with just the dreadful side effects of fossil fuels, we will enter into a future world with the dreadful side effects of fossil fuel plus the dreadful side effects of alternative-energy technologies—hardly a durable formula for community or environmental prosperity. If we had different political, legal, and economic structures and backstops to assure that alternative-energy production would directly offset fossil-fuel use, these technologies might make more sense. But it will take years to institute such vital changes. Focusing our efforts on **alternative-energy production** now only serves to distract us from the **real job** that needs to be done. Worse yet, if fundamental economic, social, and cultural upgrades are not instituted, the project of alternative energy is bound to **fail,** which would likely lead to crippling levels of public cynicism toward future efforts to produce cleaner forms of power. As it stands now, even if alternative-energy schemes were **free,** they might still be too **expensive** given their extreme social costs and striking inability to displace fossil-fuel use. But as it turns out, they aren't free at all—they're enormously expensive.

#### Claims of eco-pocalypse are BLACKMAIL that obscure the ROOT CAUSE – only the ALTERNATIVE resolves the crisis

Smith 8

PhD Johns Hopkins 1982; Dist Prof) Political economy, urban social theory, space, nature-culture, history and theory of geography (nsmith@gc.cuny.edu) Prof. SmithNeil Smith was trained as a geographer and his research explores the broad intersection between space, nature, social theory and history. He teaches in urban anthropology, cultural anthropology and environmental anthropology, and directs the Center for Place Culture and Politics. His environmental work is largely theoretical, focusing on questions of the production of nature. His urban interests include long term research on gentrification, including empirical work in North America and Europe and a series of theoretical papers emphasizing the importance of patterns of investment and disinvestment in the the real estate market. He also writes more broadly on New York City, focusing especially on the "revanchist city" which has filled the vacuum left in the wake of liberal urban theory.

The point is most certainly not to diminish the extent of environmental crisis generated by a voracious capitalist consumption of the earth's resources, and nor is it to suggest that environmental issues are somehow secondary or that they require little or limited attention. Precisely the opposite. Rather, the point is to insist that responses to environmental crises are more likely to be successful to the extent that this crisis is accurately assessed. Here a left apocalypticism seriously misses the target. Insofar as global warming as a process is taken in isolation as the central environmental dilemma—and is thereby extracted from the processes of capital accumulation and the social relations of production which significantly provoke such climate change—the dynamics leading to global warming fall out of focus. "All hands on deck to reduce the carbon footprint" may salve the liberal conscience, but it is not an especially progressive political response to global warming insofar as it misconceives nature in narrowly use-value terms; in locating the solution in a diffuse voluntarism—have you planted a tree today to offset your drive to work?—it also implicitly supposes a diffuse responsibility and causation for the problem. This gets us only so far toward understanding the causes of global warming. Most of us do not have a choice but to consume some modicum of hydrocarbon fuels for travel, heating, cooking, electricity, and so forth—not because we choose to but because alternatives are prohibitively expensive or simply impossible. The lack of alternatives is anything but voluntaristic, driven instead by calculations of competitive profitability. Apocalypticism meets liberalism where the entire realm of value and exchange-value is left aside, and the resultant solutions to very real problems entirely fail to tackle the drive toward capital accumulation which, more than anything else, is responsible for producing the use-value landscape of global warming and environmental crisis more broadly.

#### Water/food shortage doesn’t cause war – best studies

Allouche, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11

(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.

Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations

In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.

In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.

The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.

None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).

As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).

The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).

In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.

The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

## econ

#### Decline doesn’t cause war

Morris Miller, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, ‘2K

(Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### Recent empirics go neg

Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25/’9

(Thomas P.M, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.

None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.

Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends.

And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

#### Energy prices are irrelevant to manufacturing

Levi 12 (Michael A. Levi David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment, 5/7/2012, "Oil and Gas Euphoria Is Getting Out of Hand", blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/05/07/oil-and-gas-euphoria-is-getting-out-of-hand/)

But there is more. Ignatius’s column isn’t just about energy; it’s also about the resurgence of U.S. manufacturing. Here’s how he links the two: “Energy security would be one building block of a new prosperity. The other would be the revival of U.S. manufacturing and other industries. This would be driven in part by the low cost of electricity in the United States, which West forecasts will be relatively flat through the rest of this decade, and one-half to one-third that of economic competitors such as Spain, France or Germany.” Once again, these sorts of claims have become increasingly common. Indeed the quantitative assertions are perfectly plausible. But the big picture implications don’t make sense. As of 2010, total sales of U.S. manufactured goods were about five trillion dollars. At the same time, the sector spent about 100 billion dollars on energy. That’s a mere two percent of total sales. You could slash energy costs to zero, and it would barely move the needle for most U.S. manufacturers. There are, of course, exceptions, like some iron, steel, cement, and paper makers. But even these industries care about much more than their electricity prices. Will lower energy costs move things at the margin? Of course they will, and that’s good news. But they are nowhere close to what’s needed for U.S. manufacturing to broadly thrive.

#### Manufacturing loss inevitable

Thompson 12 (Derek Thompson is a senior editor at The Atlantic, where he oversees business coverage for the website., 3/9/2012, "Trade My Brain, Please! Why We Don't Need to 'Make Something' to Export It", [www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/trade-my-brain-please-why-we-dont-need-to-make-something-to-export-it/254274/](http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/trade-my-brain-please-why-we-dont-need-to-make-something-to-export-it/254274/))

The president is onto something. Exports matter. A good reason to fetishize manufacturing is right in the president's first line: "If we do stuff here, we can sell it there." As you might have caught on, I changed the word "make" in the president's speech to "do" in this paragraph, because we don't need to make something and put it in a box to sell it to foreigners. We can do stuff and sell it for foreign money, too. This sort of thing is called a "service exports." It means selling our work, or brains, and our resources to other countries. "Services exports" sounds like a rather silly or impossible thing -- like putting an American doctor in a small box, shipping him across the Pacific to hospital in Mumbai, and shipping him back with the rupees. In fact, services exports are much simpler than that. Simpler, even, than selling actual manufactured goods. If an Argentinian student goes to Harvard, that's an export. If a Korean uses a Kansas architect to design a building, that's an export. If Bain Capital advises a British investor getting in on a Moroccan start-up, that's an export. Perhaps service exports seem less "pure" than manufactured exports. In fact, there's a better case that the opposite is true. For any given "export dollar," service exports create a great share of what economists call "U.S. value added. That's a mouth-full, so you can call it "cold hard money in America." Think about a car shipped in a box from the United States to Spain. That's a U.S. export. But it's not a 100% U.S. product. The car parts might have come from one country, where they were fixed in Canada, taken south to be assembled in the United States, and shipped to Barcelona. The money made from the Spanish sale counts as a U.S. export, but the revenue is divided across the car's global supply chain. On the other hand, if a Barcelona family goes to Detroit for vacation, their euros stay in Detroit. "Business service exports had 95.6 percent U.S. value-added in 2004," the Brookings Metropolitan Policy program reported in a new study on exports. "Metropolitan areas specialized in services, such as Des Moines, Las Vegas, and Washington, D.C. tend to have higher shares of U.S. value-added in their exports than the rest of the largest 100 metro areas." The United States is the second or third largest total exporter, by various counts. But as a service exporter, we're the unambiguous world leader, commanding 14% of the world market, twice that of second-place Germany. In 2010, private services exports represented a third of U.S. exports, according to Brookings, and that number is going to keep growing. (As Scott Thomasson pointed out on Twitter, we even have a trade surplus with China.) An emphasis on exports is important because it keeps us competitive in a global market and brings in foreign money, which is especially useful for a slow economy. But we shouldn't just think of exports as stuff we can put into a box. We will continue to make things and put them in boxes and sell them in other countries. But 70% of the economy is employed in the services sector and there are five times more people working in professional services/education/leisure&hospitality than manufacturing today, and the ratio will probably grow in the next decade. We need to talk about those exporting industries, too. You don't need to make something to sell it "there."

#### No employment effect from the aff-trades-off with other sectors of the economy

Green 11

Kenneth, The Myth of Green Energy Jobs: The European Experience. D.Env., environmental science and engineering, University of California, Los Angeles. Chief Scientist, Director of Centre for Studies in Risk, Regulation, and Environment, Fraser Institute, 2002-2005

M.S., molecular genetics, San Diego State University

<http://www.aei.org/files/2011/02/15/EEO-2011-02-No-2-updated-g.pdf>

To understand the fallacy of the government creating green jobs through subsidies and regulations, we have to refer to the writing of French economist Frédéric Bastiat. Back in 1850, Bastiat explained the fallacy that underlies such thinking in an essay about the unseen costs of such efforts. He called it the “broken window” fallacy. The fallacy works as follows: imagine some shopkeepers get their windows broken by a rock-throwing child. At first, people sympathize with the shopkeepers, until someone claims that the broken windows really are not that bad. After all, they “create work” for the glassmaker, who might then be able to buy more food, benefiting the grocer, or buy more clothes, benefiting the tailor. If enough windows are broken, the glassmaker might even hire an assistant, creating a job. Did the child therefore do a public service by breaking the windows? No. We must also consider what the shopkeepers would have done with the money they used to fix their windows, had those windows not been broken. Most likely, the shopkeepers would have plowed that money back into their store; perhaps they would have bought more stock from their suppliers or hired new employees. Were the windows not broken, the town would still have had jobs created by the shopkeepers’ alternate spending, plus the shopkeepers would have had the value of their original windows. Because the value of the windows was destroyed, however, they—and the village as a whole—have been made poorer. It is well understood, among economists, that governments do not “create” jobs; the willingness of entrepreneurs to invest their capital, paired with consumer demand for goods and services, does that. All the government can do is subsidize some industries while jacking up costs for others. In the green case, it is destroying jobs in the conventional energy sector—and most likely in other industrial sectors— through taxes and subsidies to new green companies that will use taxpayer dollars to undercut the competition. The subsidized jobs “created” are, by definition, less efficient uses of capital than market-created jobs. That means they are less economically productive than the jobs they displace and contribute less to economic growth. Finally, the good produced by government-favored jobs is inherently a noneconomic good that has to be maintained indefinitely, often without an economic revenue model, as in the case of roads, rail systems, mass transit, and probably windmills, solar-power installations, and other green technologies.

#### No price spike

Menza 12 (Justin Menza, News Writer at CNBC, Financial Journalist at UBS Investment Bank Sr. Financial Writer at Standard & Poor's , 8/22/2012, "No Spike in Natural Gas Looming: Boone Pickens", [www.cnbc.com/id/48752448/No\_Spike\_in\_Natural\_Gas\_Looming\_Boone\_Pickens](http://www.cnbc.com/id/48752448/No_Spike_in_Natural_Gas_Looming_Boone_Pickens))

The U.S. should continue to have a cheap energy advantage compared to the rest of the world, T. Boone Pickens, BP Capital founder, told CNBC’s “Squawk Box” on Wednesday. “There's going to be a fabulous opportunity for natural gas, but we're not there yet,” Pickens said. Pickens expects natural gas prices to climb to $4 by the end of the year, but no major price spike. “You can make money at $4,” he said, “Of course, it's going to be better than at $2 or $3, but you aren't going to get many wells drilled.” Instead, Pickens sees a greater chance of a spike in crude oil prices. He’s predicting $115 a barrel on West Texas Intermediate crude by year’s end. Flare ups in the Middle East could cause a spike, Pickens cautioned. “If (Israel) bombs Iran, you're going to have a spike up in oil price, there's no question about that, just because they bombed Iran, not because you're going to have a shortage of oil immediately,” he said. Nonetheless, the U.S. will continue to have the world’s cheapest energy. “U.S. crude is 15 percent cheaper than Brent North Sea crude oil, and natural gas is 75 percent cheaper than China, the Mideast, Japan, or wherever else,” Pickens said.

#### Exports will be approved – but the decision hasn’t been made

Sebastian, writer for Fuel Fix, 9/19/2012

(Simone, “Politics are causing LNG export delays, attorney says,” http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/09/19/politics-are-causing-lng-export-delays-attorney-says/)

The Energy Department’s decision to delay its report on natural gas exports was a move to avoid pre-election debate about the United States’ growing position as an energy exporter, said industry attorney David Bloom Tuesday.

The long-awaited report is key to determining how much of the nation’s booming natural gas supply could be shipped to foreign countries and under what conditions. Plans to liquefy and export U.S. natural gas have been debated because of the potential impact on energy prices for domestic consumers.

The U.S. Department of Energy announced on Monday that the report will be released by the end of the year, months after it was originally planned.

“The Obama administration doesn’t want this to be a front-burner issue,” said Bloom, a partner at Mayer Brown. “The Romney campaign has not made it an issue because some of the manufacturing base that supports Romney wants low natural gas pricing.”

Still, Bloom said he expects some of the **export projects** – many stationed on the Gulf Coast – **will be approved despite the election’s outcome**. But federal approval likely won’t come until early 2013, he said.

#### Wind power increases demand for natural gas in the electricity sector

Vos, gas analyst in the Gas Coal and Power Division of the International Energy Agency, 2012

(Irene, “The Impact of Wind Power on European Natural Gas Markets,” January 2012, http://www.iea.org/papers/2012/impact\_of\_wind\_power.pdf)

This working paper discusses how an increasing wind market share changes the characteristics of the electricity demand that needs to be filled by generation capacity other than wind, the so‐ called residual demand. It discusses whether, and how the demand for fuel in the power sector changes due to an increasing wind market share, and whether, as a result, wind affects energy markets other than the electricity market.

This paper focuses on one fuel; **natural gas**, which is often identified as one of the generation fuels best suited to support an increasing wind market share, thanks to its relatively clean burning properties and its flexibility in generation. It also focuses on the effects of an increasing share of wind power in Europe (EU27), which currently is − and is expected to remain − the region with the highest wind market share in the world (IEA, 2010a).

Wind power has distinctive characteristics. Firstly, its output can vary greatly and within short periods of time. Secondly, its output cannot be completely controlled or predicted. Consequently, **an increasing wind market share puts pressure on electricity systems and increases the need for system flexibility**. Tools that can deliver flexibility include energy storage, demand‐side response, increasing interconnection and supply‐side response (i.e. other forms of generation capacity which can be ramped up or down in response to changing demand). Much of the flexibility in electricity systems is currently delivered by supply‐side response; this instrument is likely to play an important role in supporting an increasing wind market share.

A comparison of the three generation fuels with the largest shares in European power generation − coal, nuclear and natural gas − shows that generation units running on these fuels all have the technical capabilities to act as supply-side response instruments. They can all vary their output in response to changes in power demand. **Its short start-up times**, **high ramp rates and low start-up costs make natural gas the best-suited technology to support fast changes in power demand**. While both coal- and nuclear-fired technologies can vary their output, their long start-up times, lower ramp rates and high start‐up costs make them less attractive to employ as running reserve and less suitable to respond to fast demand changes.

An analysis of the effect of an increasing wind market share on residual demand shows that wind significantly alters the load duration curve (LDC) of residual demand, changing not only its size but also its slope. Comparing the LDC of demand and residual demand shows how wind strongly decreases the average capacity factor of residual demand; the share of capacity running at high capacity factors (70% to 100%) decreases, while the amount of capacity running at low capacity factors (0% to 30%) increases strongly. A decreasing capacity factor can have a significant impact on the relative profitability of investments in different types of generation capacity. As the capacity factor decreases, the levelised costs of electricity (LCOE) of generation technologies with high investment costs, such as coal- and especially nuclear-fired capacity, increase faster than those of technologies with lower investment costs, such as gas-fired capacity.

Natural gas technologies seem to be best suited to support wind power in the future, due to their relatively low investment costs and technical capabilities to deliver flexibility. This makes it likely that, **as the market share of wind increases**, **the role of natural gas** as a flexible fuel supporting wind output **increases**. As a result, **wind will** also **have a growing impact on natural gas demand in the power sector**.

#### The precedent set by export restrictions allows China to deny the U.S. rare earth metals and undermines global free trade

Levi, senior fellow for energy and environment at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2012

(Michael, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” Hamilton Project, a program of the Brookings Institution, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads\_and\_links/06\_exports\_levi.pdf)

Conversely, if the United States were to restrain LNG exports, it would almost certainly face wider trade-related problems. The consequences could be broad, **affecting support for open trade in general**, but they would likely have special impact on other resource-related disputes. Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (**GATT**) **prohibits sustained quantitative restrictions on energy exports** unless they are related “to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption” (Selivanova 2007). U.S. policy would be the opposite: it would be made in conjunction with efforts to encourage both domestic production and consumption of natural gas. Indeed, the United States has recently joined Europe and Japan **in challenging Chinese restrictions on exports of rare earth metals**—**which are critical to a variety of defense**, **electronics**, **and energy technologies**—**at the** World Trade Organization (**WTO**) (Palmer 2011). The arguments that the United States would need to invoke in order to restrain LNG exports—particularly the prospects of environmental damage and harm to domestic industry—are precisely those that China would like to use to defend its own restrictions on rare earths exports; China could all but take the U.S. justification of curbs on LNG exports, change a few words, and use it in its own defense. It would likely be difficult for the United States to sustain limits to U.S. LNG exports while fighting Chinese limits on exports of rare earth metals.

#### Rare earth dominance gives China a strategic edge

Hurst 10

<http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinas-ace-in-the-hole.html>

 Lieutenant Commander Cindy A. Hurst, USNR, is a Research Analyst in the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

REEs are important to hundreds of high-tech applications, including critical military-based technologies such as precisionguided weapons and night-vision goggles. In exploring the idea of global military might, China appears to be holding an unlikely trump card. The country's grasp on the rare earth element industry could one day give China a strong technological advantage and increase its military superiority. This article focuses on rare earth elements and their importance to military technology. It also demonstrates how China's research and development programs, coupled with its vast reserves of REEs, have the potential to make the country a dominant force in the world.

#### That causes nuclear great power war

Walton 2007

(C. Dale Walton, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49// GH-aspomer)

Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of Eastern Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success in such an endeavor is not as easily attainable as pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track to be a very great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any Chinese effort to establish sole hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal American intervention in local squabbles. The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the balance of power, thus both necessitating very active American intervention in Eastern Eurasia and creating the underlying conditions for a massive, and probably nuclear, great power war. Absent such a "super-threat," however, the demands on American leaders will be far more subtle; creating the conditions for Washington's gentle decline from playing the role of unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.

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Brown, judge – Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, ‘59

(John R., “CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION,” Dissenting Opinion, 266 F.2d 208; 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 5196; 10 Oil & Gas Rep. 601)

 Indeed, I do not think that my cautious Brothers would have undertaken this excursion had they not first have found (or assumed) a basis for considering production in its ordinary, common usage. For clearly, what the Court says does not follow if the term is used in the sense of the oil and gas field. For example, the Court states, 'In the ordinary language of purchase and sale of a product where it is in deliverable form the stream of gas is, in a sense, 'produced' at the latest after it has passed through the first master valve. \* \* \*.' Again, it states, 'but this does not change the fact that in the ordinary sense of the terms production of the gas has been completed at or just above the surface of the ground where it is physically deliverable but then is shut in until delivery commences.'To support this approach, the Court frankly states that 'our duty here is not to determine what is generally understood in the industry, in the resolution of other relationships, is meant by 'production." It is, rather, the Court goes on to say 'to determine what Congress meant by the term.' Reading § 1(b) as though it contained only the first part of the sentence and disregarding [\*\*35] altogether the exclusionary phrases at its end, the Court then proceeds to find that the sole Congressional purpose was 'to regulate these interstate sales.' This causes the Court then to reject the industry context and adopt a construction of 'production' which 'is in line with ordinary non-technical usage' so that it will 'effectuate and not \* \* \* frustrate the purpose of the law.'.' The abundant legislative history canvassed by the many Supreme Court cases But Congress was not legislating in an atmosphere of 'ordinary non-technical usage reveals an articulate awareness of the complexities of this whole business. The object of § 1(b) was clearly to define the purpose to regulate [\*220] transportation and sale and companies engaged in such transportation or sale. This was done against the background fully known to Congress that at one end of the process was the production of the natural gas, that at the other end was the consumer, and in between were those who transported and distributed it. As pointed out in Part I above, the Court has been emphatic in ascribing an intention to Congress to exclude those matters which relate to the local production activities [\*\*36] traditionally reserved to states for their exclusive control.We are told that § 1(b) exclusion is a provision '\* \* \* that \* \* \* precludes the Commission from and control over the activity of producing or gathering natural gas. \* \* \*.' Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 1945, 324 U.S. 581, 603, 65 S.Ct. 829, 839, 89 L.Ed. 1206. Two years later this was reiterated in Interstate Natural Gas Company v. FPC, 1947, 331 U.S. 682, 690, 67 S.Ct. 1482, 1487, 91 L.Ed. 1742. 'Clearly, among the powers thus reserved to the States is the power to regulate the physical production and gathering of natural gas in the interests of conservation or of any other consideration of legitimate local concern. It was the intention of Congress to give the States full freedom in these matters.'Within another two years this was reemphasized in FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 1949, 337 U.S. 498, 509-13, 69 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 93 L.Ed. 1499. 'To accept these arguments springing from power to allow interstate service, fix rates and control abandonment would establish wide control by the Federal Power Commission over the production and gathering [\*\*37] of gas. It would invite expansion of power into other phases of the forbidden area. It would be an assumption of powers specifically denied the Commission by the words of the Act as explained in the report and on the floor of both Houses of Congress. The legislative history of this Act is replete with evidence of the care taken by Congress to keep the power over the production and gathering of gas within the states.'How Congress expected to preserve the absolute freedom of the States in matters concerning production unless that term was used in the context of that industry is nowhere made clear by my Brothers. If Congress were to adhere to its purpose, carefully to regulate some but not all of the natural gas moving of dedicated to move in interstate commerce, it was required to prescribe the boundary limits of each in terms of the business and industry to be regulated. That is the usual, not the extraordinary, principle of statutory construction long ago set forth in Unwin v. Hanson, (1891) 2 Q.B. 115, 119, approved in O'Hara v. Luckenback Steamship Co., 1926, 269 U.S. 364, 370-371, 46 S.Ct. 157, 160, 70 L.Ed. 313:'If the act is one [\*\*38] passed with reference to a particular trade, business, or transaction, and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business, or transaction, knows and understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning, though it may differ from the common or ordinary meaning of the words.'And see 50 Am.Jur., Statutes § 277 (1944).What is 'production of natural gas' is to be determined in the light of the actual substantive conditions and engineering-business requirements of that great field of scientific mechanical activity. Such activity is not to be assayed by Judges who, learned in the law, have naught but the limited technical experience and cumulative knowledge of the ordinary person.Judged by the standards of the industry, not only by what was said and uncontradicted, but by what was done on a large scale in this very field, the Commission could only find that all of Continental's facilities were essential to and a part of the production of gas. [\*221] IV.The Court's action and opinion is portentous. It is so precisely because it is based on an erroneous assumption and an equally [\*\*39] erroneous construction. It assumes that we are fact finders to supplant or supplement the expert agency. It finds the capacity to cope with this problem by relieving it of all technical complexities and casting it in the mold of the ordinary meaning of production.The Court finds 'that in the ordinary sense of the term production of the gas has been completed at or just above the surface of the ground where it is physically deliverable \* \* \*.' (emphasis in the original) Tying this in to the point of delivery (at the very extreme end of Continental's 4-inch master value and at the very beginning of El Paso's swage), the Court has necessarily adopted the approach of the Commission that facilities for the sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission are those 'serving to contain the gas at the point of delivery.' That it means to champion this construction is likewise established by the Court's unqualified approval, both here and in Sun Oil Company v. FPC, 5 Cir., 1959, 266 F.2d 222, of J. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, 3 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d 550, 556 and Saturn Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 10 Cir., 1957, 250 F.2d 61, 69, [\*\*40] the latter of which states: 'To us it is clear that facilities necessary to effect a sale of gas in interstate commerce are facilities used in interstate commerce and are within the jurisdiction of the Commission. This would seem to be the plain intent of section 7(c). The Third Circuit has so held in J. M. Huber Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 3 Cir., 236 F.2d 550, 556.'The vice of this rationale is compounded by the Court's interpretation of 'production' or 'production facilities' in terms of ordinary non-industry connotation. But even without this, if the test is to be stated in terms of that piece of equipment which is needed to effectuate the sale or contain the gas at the point of sale delivery, then there is in fact no physical limitation. In those terms the master valve (whether upper or lower, or both) does not alone contain the gas. The master valves are ineffective without the continuation of the leakproof surface casing, the production casing or many other parts of the well, all of which operate simultaneously and indispensably to bring and hold the gas under effective control.That is critical since § 7(c) requires certification [\*\*41] of facilities which are to be constructed or extended. And once a little intrusion is made into the forbidden 1(b) area of production, it is only logical to expect (and justify) application of the full reach of this concept. It stops in a given well where, but only where, the particular piece of equipment may be said to directly assist in the containment of the gas at delivery point. Worse, it means that by the force of § 7(c), the drilling and equipping of a new well could only be done by express approval of the Commission.We and all others have now firmly held that on the commencement of the first jurisdictional sale, the Commission's power attaches at least to the sale. The Court by our present opinion holds that simultaneously power attaches to some piece of gas well equipment. If the jurisdictional sale setting all of this Federal control in motion is in the common form of a long-term dedication-of-reserves- contract by which the mineral owner undertakes to develop a field and deliver all production to the long line pipe line purchaser, the result will be that the drilling of additional wells may not be done except on Commission terms and approval. In such [\*\*42] a situation the 'new' well would, of course, be the means by which to effectuate the sale of the gas. Since this would constitute 'the construction or extension of any facilities' for the sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and would result in the acquisition and operation of 'such facilities or extensions thereof,' it would, as § 7(c) demands, positively require that the Commission issue a certificate of public [\*222] convenience and necessity 'authorizing such acts or operation.'Combining this opinion and Sun Oil, this day decided, this Court binds a gas well owner to produce gas for as long as the Commission prescribes. Neither the length of the contract nor the production-nature of the facility by which the 'service' (sale) is performed are an effective limitation. Until nature shuts off the gas the Commission is the perpetual regulator from whose power the Commission's own brief says, '\* \* \* there is no \* \* \* hiding place.'Congress did not mean to invest its creature with these scriptural powers (Psalms 139:7, 8). Section 1(b) draws the line at production.

## Warming

## solvency

#### Wind can’t replace fossil fuels

Zehner, 12

(Green illusions, Visiting Scholar-UC Berkeley, MS-University of Amsterdam-Science & Technology Studies, Google Books)

Lifecycle calculations reveal that wind power technologies actually rely heavily on fossil fuels (which is partly why their costs have dramatically increased over the last decade). In practice, this leaves so-called renewable wind power as a mere fossil-fuel hybrid. This spurs some questions. First, if fossil-fuel and raw-material prices pull up turbine costs, to what degree can nations rely on wind power as a hedge against resource scarcity? Moreover, where will the power come from to build the next generation of wind turbines as earlier ones retire from service? Alternative-energy productivists would likely point to the obvious—just use the power from the former generation. But if we will presumably be using all of that output for our appliances, lighting, and driving the kids to school, will there be enough excess capacity left over? Probably not—especially given that the most favorable windy spots, which have been largely exploited, are purportedly satisfying less than 1 percent of global power demands. We'll likely have to fall back on fossil fuels. Wind is renewable. Turbines are not.

#### Wind is lies – it’s based on cherry picked data.

Zehner, 12

(Green illusions, Visiting Scholar-UC Berkeley, MS-University of Amsterdam-Science & Technology Studies, Google Books)

When President Obama premiered his clean energy initiative in Newton, Iowa, he cited a prominent U.S. Department of Energy (doe) report showing that the nation could easily obtain 20 percent of its electricity from wind turbines by 2030—he may have been completely unaware that the report's key dataset wasn't from the doe at all. In fact, if genuine doe cost and performance figures had been used, the report's authors would likely have come to the opposite conclusion—20 percent wind by 2030 will be logistically complex, enormously expensive, and perhaps ultimately unachievable. Much of the enthusiasm surrounding wind power in recent years has grown out of this prominent Bush-era report entitled 20% Wind Energy by 2030, which concludes that filling 20 percent of the nation's grid with wind power is achievable and will come at a cost described as "modest." The authoritative doe report has been held up as a model for charting a course for wind energy funding; it has been covered by media sources across the globe, presented to congressional leaders, evoked by two presidents, and supported by the Sierra Club, the Worldwatch Institute, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and dozens of other organizations.29 In fact, during my investigative research on the study, I didn't come across a single critical review of its findings. It is therefore particularly intriguing to note that the report is based on key assumptions, hidden within a second appendix, which are so explicitly incongruent with bona fide doe data that many people might have considered them to be outright fraudulent had they not been produced within the protective halo surrounding alternative-energy research. This doe report, which probably seemed ecologically progressive to its unwitting list of environmentalist cosponsors, may ultimately prove a tremendous disservice to their cause. The report's most remarkable conclusion is simple. Filling 20 percent of the grid with wind power over the next twenty years will cost just 2 percent more than a scenario without wind power.50 The conclusion teeters atop a conspicuous pile of cost and performance figures developed by industry consultants, despite the fact that the doe already spends millions of dollars tabulating the same sorts of data on a routine basis. The report cites four "major" contributors outside the Department of Energy: a trade organization called American Wind Energy Association (awea) and three consulting firms—Black and Veatch, Energetics Incorporated, and Renewable Energy Consulting Services. Would perhaps any one of these groups have something to gain from painting an optimistic rendering of wind's future? It turns out they all do. And that potential gain can be measured in billions. When the report was written, the awea's board of directors included executives from General Electric, JP Morgan, Shell, John Deere, and a handful of wind power companies including T. Boone Pickens's company Mesa Power. As an industry group, the awea was interested in orchestrating a positive spin on anything wind. The awea salivated in anticipation of preparing a pro-wind report enshrouded by the credibility of the Department of Energy. But, there was a problem. The doe's field data on wind turbine performance was too grim—too realistic—for a report destined to pump up the future of wind power. Far more favorable statistics would be required. And the consultant employed to produce the stand-in datasets would not disappoint. The authors retained Black and Veatch—a consultancy that designs both wind farms and natural-gas generation plants—to develop cost projections as well as key capacity factors for the analysis.31 Remember, a capacity factor is simply the percentage of a wind turbine's nameplate capacity that is actually produced under real-world conditions—the difference of a percent or two can make or break a wind farm. According to doe data, when countries or regions start to install wind turbines, the average capacity factor goes up at first, then levels off or declines as additional turbines are sited in less-ideal locations.32 For instance, between 1985 and 2001, the average capacity factor in California rose impressively from 13 percent to 24 percent, but has since retreated to around 22 percent. Over recent years, Europe's maturing wind farms have stabilized below 21 percent.33 The U.S. average is under 26 percent, according to field readings from the doe. That's why Black and Veatch's capacity-factor assumptions, starting at 35 percent to 52 percent in 2010, and continuing to increase 15 percent by 2030, are particularly shocking. Black and Veatch's average capacity-factor estimations rank among the highest ever published anywhere, let alone in a formal government report. If Black and Veatch knows how to run the nation's turbines at such high capacity, then they know something that nobody else does. Even the pro-wind awea caps realistic capacity factors at a terribly optimistic 40 percent—so, incidentally, does the Department of Energy.34 In fact, Black and Veatch's expectation that capacity factors for wind turbines will increase over the next twenty years conflicts with other doe reports, which forecast turbulence as future wind farms are forced into subprime locations. The knowledgeable public servants at the doe might have laughed Black and Veatch out of Washington. But they didn't. They got them published. The justifications for employing such extraordinary assumptions are not entirely clear. During my investigation, a doe official assured me that the Black and Veatch figures "were extensively critiqued and adjusted by experts in the wind and general energy communities." Though when I asked a director at Black and Veatch why their figures differed so dramatically from doe assumptions, he was rather tight-lipped, insisting only that they stood by the methodology as outlined in the report.35 That's particularly disconcerting. The report's methodology section states simply, "Black and Veatch used historical capacity factor data to create a logarithmic best-fit line, which is then applied to each wind power class to project future performance improvements." It seems the consultancy assumed that the wind turbine learning curve (i.e., the idea that past experience with a technology helps to improve the technology and reduce its costs) would continue to produce gains well into the future. While it is well accepted that this occurred through the 1980s and 1990s, the learning curve has since flattened, as the doe has documented. Therefore, extrapolating a select few years of data into the future without acknowledging the industry's maturation is as problematic as extrapolating the growth of high school students to show that by college they will stand taller than giraffes. In addition to the optimistic capacity-factor projections, the report's analysis includes mysterious historical data. Black and Veatch "estimated" capacity factors ranging from 32 percent to 47 percent in2005.36 The report fails to mention that doe fieldwork from that year placed the actual nationwide capacity factor closer to 20 percent.37 (When I asked Black and Veatch about the discrepancy, they offered no further comment.) These discrepancies aren't the only surprises lurking in the report's appendices. Black and Veatch assumed that the costs for building, installing, and maintaining future wind turbines will not increase, as other doe reports predict, but will actually decrease, due to what it black-boxes as "technology development." But since today's turbine designs are already close to their theoretical maximum efficiency, the future success of wind power may be less influenced by technological development than by social and environmental variables. Many of the windiest sites present high barriers to entry. Since turbines must be spaced at least five rotor-diameters apart side-to-side and at least ten rotor diameters front-to-back in order to avoid a wind "shading" effect, vast stretches of land rights must be secured in order to create even a modestly scaled wind farm. Offshore sites are easier to procure and have strong, consistent winds, but they are expensive to develop, connect, and maintain for obvious reasons—inaccessibility, deep sea beds, high waves, corrosive salt water, hurricanes, and so on. The Department of Energy expects that suboptimal environments—with greater wind turbulence, wind variability, and unfavorable site factors such as steep slopes, terrain roughness, and reduced accessibility—will push up the cost of most of the remaining wind farm sites by some 200 percent.38 When Black and Veatch's capacity-factor assumptions are compounded by their cost assumptions, readers are left with an impression of wind power that is up to six times more impressive than if the analysis were run using the doe's own figures.39 This raises the question, Why did the Department of Energy base its pivotal wind energy report on numbers conjured up by an engineering firm, with a vested interest in advancing energy production interests, rather than its own data? This is the question I posed to the doe. Their response was telling. They made it apparent that even though the report claims to contain "influential scientific information," its analyses might not be recognized as such by the greater scientific community.40 One of the report's lead editors told me, "The 20 % Wind work was carried out to develop a picture of a future in which 20 percent of the nation's electricity is provided from the wind, and to assess the feasibility of that picture. The work was based on the assumption that reasonable orderly advancement of the technology would continue, and that key issues needing resolution would be addressed and favorably resolved. Hence the work used input information and assumptions that were forward-looking rather than constrained by recent history."41 Indeed, the authors did not allow recent history to stand in their way. In fact, some might argue that their answer echoes the rhetoric used to defend the fabrication of data for which no historical justification or cultural context exists. Energy players employed such lines of reasoning to suggest that by the 1960s, nuclear energy would produce abundant clean energy for all, that by the 1970s, fusion power would be too cheap to meter, and that solar cells would be fueling the world's economies by 1986.42 With the advantage of hindsight, historians of science romp in the particulars of how such declarations rose to prominence. They show how genuine inquiry was often pushed aside to make room for the interests of industrial elites in their attempts to pry open taxpayer coffers for subsidies.

#### Selection bias leads to crazy capacity factor exaggerations

Zehner, 12

(Green illusions, Visiting Scholar-UC Berkeley, MS-University of Amsterdam-Science & Technology Studies, Google Books)

Yes, reasons Nicolas Boccard, author of two academic papers recently published in Energy Policy.43 In his opinion, the kind of tomfoolery going on at the doe is nothing particularly shocking. Boccard, who studies the phenomenon of capacity-factor exaggerations in Europe, found that when solid data do not exist, wind proponents are all too willing to make "unsubstantiated guesses." They get away with it because the public, politicians, journalists, and even many energy experts don't understand how capacity factors are involved in influencing prospects for wind power development. Or, perhaps caught up in the excitement surrounding wind energy, proponents may simply not care, due to a psychological phenomenon called selection bias,

 whereby people tend to overvalue information that reinforces their ideology and undervalue that which contradicts it. Boccard insists, "We cannot fail to observe that academic outlets geared at renewable energy sources naturally attract the authors themselves supportive of renewable energy sources, as their writing style clearly indicates. As a consequence, this community has (unconsciously) turned a blind eye to the capacity factor issue." He compared wind farm data across many European countries, where wind power penetration is many times higher than in the United States. He uncovered a worrisome gap between the anticipated and realized output of wind turbines. In fact, Boccard maintains, the difference was so large that wind power ended up being on average 67 percent more expensive and 40 percent less effective than researchers had predicted. As a rule of thumb, he maintains that any country-level assumptions of capacity factors exceeding 30 percent should be regarded as "mere leaps of faith."44

## 2nc boomerang\*

**Jevon’s paradox ensures demands matches supply – empirics are overwhelming**

**Zehner 12**

Green illusions,

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Zehner primarily researches the social, political and economic conditions influencing energy policy priorities and project outcomes. His work also incorporates symbolic roles that energy technologies play within political and environmental movements. His other research interests include consumerism, urban policy, environmental governance, international human rights, and forgeries.

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The Rebound Effect Phantom The nineteenth century brought us a collection of ghoulish and chilling immortals—the headless horseman of Sleepy Hollow, Bram Stoker's Dracula, and even Abraham Lincoln's phantom train, which has been heard leaving Washington DC late at night on a circuitous funeral route toward Springfield, Illinois, where it never arrives. It was during this era, in 1865, that a man named William Stanley Jevons wrote a book about a similar sort of phantom. His book, entitled The Coal Question, started out innocently enough. Jevons documented how James Watt's introduction of the steam engine greatly improved efficiency. Seems nice. But this increase in efficiency in turn made steam engines more popular and ultimately drove coal use ever higher.4 This rebound effect, also termed the "Jevons paradox," arises again and again in various incarnations **throughout the history of energy use**: Increases in energy efficiency make energy services relatively cheaper, encouraging greater **consumption.** Energy efficiency can actually lead to negative environmental impacts unless regions institute taxes, caps, or regulations to prevent growing consumption patterns from smothering efficiency gains. As long as energy-efficiency strategies come with checks to prevent the rebound effect, efficiency proponents argue that they are highly effective. For instance, new refrigerators use just a fraction of the energy of models sold decades ago, yet because there is a limit to the amount of refrigeration space one can fit in a kitchen, the benefits of efficiency are usually not usurped by the rebound effect. Similarly, there's no indication that drivers of small cars, who achieve twice the gasoline efficiency of those driving large vehicles, tend to drive twice as much as a result. And based on numerous case studies of businesses, Rocky Mountain Institute researchers claim, "We have not seen evidence that radically more efficient commercial buildings cause people to leave the lights on all night and set their office thermostats five degrees lower. In fact, energy savings in everything from office towers to schools have often been higher than projected. People do not seem to change their behaviors simply because they have a more efficient building."5 That's nice, too. But it's not the whole story. There's another problem. Even though energy consumers might not spend their efficiency savings to buy more energy, they may choose to spend these savings on other products or endeavors that still lead to energy consumption. In this case, energy-efficiency measures can unintentionally inspire other types of consumption, leaving overall energy footprints unchanged or even larger. This occurs at the macroeconomic level as well. In short, energy-efficiency savings frequently lead to larger profits, which spur more growth and thus higher energy consumption. For instance, another Rocky Mountain Institute study shows that reducing drafts, increasing natural light, and otherwise making workplaces more efficient, can increase worker productivity by as much as 16 percent.6 This higher productivity allows firms to grow, and the resulting labor cost savings can be spent on new machinery, buildings, or expansion. These rebound effects often dwarf the original energy-efficiency effects, leading to **far greater** overall **energy consumption.**7 In fact, the authors of a central report on the rebound effect conclude, "While the promotion of energy efficiency has an important role to play in achieving a sustainable economy, it is unlikely to be sufficient while rich countries continue to pursue high levels of economic growth."8 Thus, efficiency efforts will only prove effective as long as we institute contemporaneous reforms to move from a **consumption-based economy** to one grounded in sufficiency.

## at: tech transfer

Global cuts are meaningless absent China

Chandler, 8 – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

(William, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb57_chandler_final.pdf>)

Together, China and the United States produce 40 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. Their actions to curb or expand energy consumption will determine whether efforts to stop global climate change succeed or fail. If these two nations act to curb emissions, the rest of the world can more easily coalesce on a global plan. If either fails to act, the mitigation strategies adopted by the rest of the world will fall far short of averting disaster for large parts of the earth. These two nations are now joined in what energy analyst Joe Romm has aptly called “a mutual suicide pact.” American leaders point to emissions growth in China and demand that Chinese leaders take responsibility for climate change. Chinese leaders counter that American per capita greenhouse gas emissions are five times theirs and say, “You created this problem, you do something about it.” Concern for energy security deepens this dilemma. U.S. congressional staff experts think energy is **twice as likely** to cause **conflict** between the two countries as human rights. Mainstream Americans fear that China is gobbling up oil and driving up the price of gasoline. The Chinese fear American control of Middle East oil and of shipping lanes to China.However, current events are opening a window for change. The United States is moving to address climate change, if only at the state level. Almost half the fifty states have made significant commitments to cut carbon emissions. Crucially, Chinese leaders recently suggested that they might be willing to make a climate commitment. Analysts at the Energy Research Institute, a leading Chinese government think tank, suggest that China could cut its current emissions growth rate by half through 2020, and from that level reduce absolute emissions by one-third by 2050. This scenario would put within reach a global goal of stabilizing the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide below 500 parts per million. Such a commitment would represent a profound shift in China’s position, and it could be **pivotal** in reducing the worst risks of climate change. Thus, a path can be glimpsed to breaking the suicide pact and achieving a bilateral breakthrough, if Chinese and American leaders and policy makers can find a deeper understanding of energy realities; grasp the need for immediate action to reduce carbon emissions; and develop a new, non-treaty-based approach to reaching an international agreement—and eventually even a post-Kyoto global climate accord.

And every other country

Koetzle, 8 - Ph.D. and Senior Vice President of Public Policy at the Institute for Energy Research

(William, "IER Rebuttal to Boucher White Paper", <http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/04/13/ier-rebuttal-to-boucher-white-paper/>

Take for example the following chart from the Energy Information Agency (EIA).[[6]](http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/04/13/ier-rebuttal-to-boucher-white-paper/%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn6%22%20%5Co%20%22_ftnref6) This chart presents a detailed view of current and projected world energy-related CO2 emissions (1990 to 2030). This chart shows that in 2004, the United States accounted for approximately 22% of world CO2 emissions. By 2030, the EIA estimates that the United States’ share of these emissions will fall to about 18.5%. It also shows where the increases in CO2 emissions will occur over the next two decades: in the developing (i.e. non-OECD) countries. Currently energy-related CO2 emissions are roughly equivalent between OECD (developed) and non-OECD countries; by 2030 this ratio will change: Developed countries will be responsible for less than 40% of emissions. Notice specifically that China’s and India’s CO2 emissions are estimated to increase by 139% and 94% respectively. As the Committee White Paper notes, several states and regions have acted in the absence of federal legislation to enact GHG reduction programs. California, for example, passed AB 32 which establishes a goal of reducing emissions to 25% below 1990 levels by 2020. California currently accounts for about 6.7% of total United States emissions[[7]](http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/04/13/ier-rebuttal-to-boucher-white-paper/%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn7%22%20%5Co%20%22_ftnref7); and about 1.5% of world-wide energy-related CO2 emissions. If California were successful in achieving this very significant reduction in emissions, how would this impact net global CO2 emissions? The answer is not much. California’s reduction by 2030 would reduce the growth in United States emissions by about 13%; and the reduction would only offset about 4% of China’s increase in emissions over the same period. This table also helps to illustrate what happens to global net CO2 emissions, given reduction scenarios undertaken by an individual nation or a group of nations. For example, if the United States were to unilaterally reduced emissions by 30% or 40% below 2004 levels[[8]](http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/04/13/ier-rebuttal-to-boucher-white-paper/%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn8%22%20%5Co%20%22_ftnref8) by 2030; net global CO2 emissions would still increase by more than 40%. The reason is straightforward: either of these reduction levels is offset by the increases in CO2 emissions in developing countries. For example, a 30% cut below 2004 levels by 2030 by the United States offsets less than 60% of China’s increase in emissions during the same period. In fact, even if the United States were to eliminate all CO2 emissions by 2030, without any corresponding actions by other countries, world-wide emissions would still increase by 30%. If the United States were joined by the other OECD countries in a CO2 reduction effort, net emissions would still significantly increase. In the event of an OCED-wide reduction of 30%, global emissions increase by 33%; a reduction of 40% still leads to a net increase of just under 30%. Simply put, in order to hold CO2 emissions at 2004 levels, absent any reductions by developing nations like China and India, all OECD emissions would have to cease.[[9]](http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/04/13/ier-rebuttal-to-boucher-white-paper/%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn9%22%20%5Co%20%22_ftnref9)

#### Durban failed because of EQUITY concerns—the aff may be a nice step, but it doesn’t cause sign-on

Arsel and Buscher 12

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Arsel, M. and Büscher, B. (2012), Nature™ Inc.: Changes and Continuities in Neoliberal Conservation and Market-based Environmental Policy. Development and Change, 43: 53–78. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2012.01752.x

In seeking to displace hegemonic understandings of sustainability (and its attendant technical and scientific expertise) that often perversely blamed ‘overpopulation’ and poverty for the growing ecological crises, critical social scientists have come to see ‘limits’ as a dirty word that can only be used by those who wish to perpetuate the unequal consumption patterns of the industrial West and its dominance over the developing world. Consequently, while paying lip service to certain distant biophysical limits (e.g. Mehta, 2010), social scientists have expended much energy attempting to reveal the multitudes of possibilities inherent in the concept of nature. In so doing, however, the fact that for capitalism to prosper, certain ecological preconditions need to be met has come to be neglected. Given the adaptability of capitalist production systems to external constraints and the ability of science and technology to deliver innovative solutions to capital's needs, it would be a mistake to see these preconditions in strict and clearly defined terms. Rather, following James O’Connor (1998), it is potentially fruitful to recognize them as ‘conditions of production’ which capitalism tends to ‘underproduce’. Of course one of the ways in which nature has been forcefully acting on capitalism can be seen in the way it imposes limits to and forced change upon capitalist expansion. Indeed, by the time the Johannesburg Summit of 2002 came around, these limits had become much more difficult to deny, revealing the ultimate futility of working with sustainable development, a concept that had become a ‘buzzword largely devoid of content’ (Esty, 2001: 74). The ‘hyper-development’ of China (Wen and Li, 2007) further signified the poverty of the concept, showing that if and when economic development did take hold in previously ‘underdeveloped’ lands, this would not follow the ‘ecological modernization’ route to decoupling of economic output and environmental impact. Most significantly, however, it is the unfolding of the global climate crisis that has shown capitalism's paradoxical relation with (the idea of) ecological limits. It wants to acknowledge and overcome these according to its own logic (e.g. by creating a more all-encompassing global carbon market within particular emission limits) but cannot do so in relation to the other, social limits that it has engendered, especially massive global inequality (see also Fletcher, this issue, and McAfee, this issue). Hence, the justifiable demands of developing nations such as India for ‘space for basic development for its people and poverty eradication’21 clashes with the need for capitalism to continuously expand. The tension between these two dynamics has created an intractable situation as evidenced by the failure of the Copenhagen, Cancun and, most recently, Durban summits. The main outcome of Durban is an ultra-weak agreement that is very unlikely to either bring the environmental impact of global economic processes to within ecological limits, or help alleviate the prevailing poverty and inequality that characterizes contemporary capitalism.22 Just as the growing alarm of the impact of industrial development in the 1970s led to the concept of sustainable development in the 1980s, the second wave of global alarm that has been building since the turn of the millennium has given birth to another catchy phrase that seeks to soothe global fears regarding the tension between economic growth and conservation. The Brundtland Report had not only refused to acknowledge that unlimited growth might not be possible but also posited further economic growth as the solution to the environmental crisis. Specifically, it argued, ‘[If] large parts of the developing world are to avert economic, social and environmental catastrophes, it is essential that global economic growth be revitalized. In practical terms, this means more rapid economic growth in both industrial and developing countries’ (WCED, 1987: 89). It is therefore not surprising that the UNEP Green Economy report takes a similar tack by inviting the world to further intensify economic growth in order to reach sustainable development. And this is done not in an apologetic manner, but through pronouncing absolute truths under hegemonic convictions (Igoe et al., 2010). The report states that by addressing the ‘misallocation of capital’ it tackles several ‘myths’, the most prevalent of which is the myth ‘that there is an inescapable trade-off between environmental sustainability and economic progress’, which it defines as ‘investments, growth and jobs’ (UNEP, 2011: 16).

#### Simple hardware transfer models fail – have to contest the frame of tech and cost solutions

Byrne et al 11

<http://scholar.googleusercontent.com/scholar?q=cache:Qtsahqx66kUJ:scholar.google.com/+neoliberalism+byrne+energy&hl=en&as_sdt=0,9>

<http://www.steps-centre.org/PDFs/Energy_PathwaysWP.pdf>.

A recurring theme in studies and policies for energy and development is the role innovation can play in improving sustainable energy access. International climate change negotiations place an emphasis on low-carbon technology transfer, which perpetuates a long history of expectations about technology providing solutions to energy and development challenges. Whilst these expectations are not entirely unfounded, this history indicates that solving the many problems associated with the provision of energy services involves a more complex set of interdependent processes than ‘straightforward’ transfer of technology. And yet, international discussions are intensifying (once again) around innovation in the form of technology transfer; discussions that frame the issue, we argue, in terms of financing the flow of low-carbon technological hardware to developing countries. This ‘hardware and finance’ framing of low-carbon development has resulted in a limited number of general purpose policy instruments – such as the Clean Development Mechanism – that tend to neglect important details of how technology can be ‘transferred’ successfully and sustainably. Moreover, they seem to neglect the contestable purposes of low-carbon development more broadly and the limited, though vital, roles technology transfer plays therein. Given the diversity of situations and concerns in energy and development, such a generalised yet narrow framing of the challenge could prove problematic. Drawing upon the history of technology transfer, and discussing the record of the Clean Development Mechanism, this paper questions just how much the dominant ‘hardware and finance’ framing will help communities explore and develop lowcarbon pathways that meet their needs. Our view is that a much broader and ambitions approach to energy and development is needed. We suggest a ‘sociotechnical transformation’ framework for organising low-carbon energy initiatives in development. In making this argument, we use a pathways approach to understanding the challenges of energy and development; an approach being developed by the STEPS Centre at the University of Sussex. Having argued for a broader and more plural perspective, we conclude the paper by suggesting a research agenda for testing its potential.

#### No absorption capacity and predatory tech transfer dictates failure, turns the advantage

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<http://scholar.googleusercontent.com/scholar?q=cache:Qtsahqx66kUJ:scholar.google.com/+neoliberalism+byrne+energy&hl=en&as_sdt=0,9>

It should be clear from this brief description of the CDM portfolio that, while we need to be careful not to over-interpret project distributions, there are strong biases that result directly from the desire among the industrialised nations for economically efficient carbon reductions – the main determinant for the form the mechanism has taken. The significance of these biases is that diversity is being constrained – in terms of contexts where low-carbon technologies are being deployed, and in terms of the kinds of technologies being developed. In the shortterm, there are benefits of both a public and private nature. Global public goods benefits derive from (cheaper) climate change mitigation, but the private gains are likely to be skewed in favour of industrialised-country firms. In other words, the CDM reinforces static comparative advantages. It is not transforming local contexts in a way that makes a broadening geography of locations attractive for low-carbon investment. Consequently, the least-developed countries risk being marginalised. At worse, they may even be left with little option but to establish carbon-intensive development pathways. In the long-term, there may be little absorptive capacity for low-carbon technologies in these countries. As the need to mitigate climate change becomes increasingly urgent, low-carbon technologies may be imposed on the least-developed countries, undermining the hard-won development gains, and good development practice, of recent years. Moreover, with low absorptive capacity, there is a high likelihood that low-carbon technologies will fail in the least-developed countries, undermining climate change mitigation also.

Impossible to cut global emissions – no modeling or momentum

**Mead 10** (Walter Russell, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, The Death of Global Warming, February 1, <http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/02/01/the-death-of-global-warming/>)

The global warming movement as we have known it is dead. Its health had been in steady decline during the last year as the once robust hopes for a strong and legally binding treaty to be agreed upon at the Copenhagen Summit faded away. By the time that summit opened, campaigners were reduced to hoping for a ‘politically binding’ agreement to be agreed that would set the stage for the rapid adoption of the legally binding treaty. After the failure of the summit to agree to even that much, the movement went into a rapid decline. The movement died from two causes: bad science and bad politics. After years in which global warming activists had lectured everyone about the overwhelming nature of the scientific evidence, it turned out that the most prestigious agencies in the global warming movement were breaking laws, hiding data, and making inflated, bogus claims resting on, in some cases, no scientific basis at all. This latest story in the London Times is yet another shocker; the IPCC’s claims that the rainforests were going to disappear as a result of global warming are as bogus and fraudulent as its claims that the Himalayan glaciers would melt by 2035. It seems as if a scare story could grab a headline, the IPCC simply didn’t care about whether it was reality-based. With this in mind, ‘climategate’ — the scandal over hacked emails by prominent climate scientists — looks sinister rather than just unsavory. The British government has concluded that University of East Anglia, home of the research institute that provides the global warming with much of its key data, had violated Britain’s Freedom of Information Act when scientists refused to hand over data so that critics could check their calculations and methods. Breaking the law to hide key pieces of data isn’t just ‘science as usual,’ as the global warming movement’s embattled defenders gamely tried to argue. A cover-up like that suggests that you indeed have something to conceal. The urge to make the data better than it was didn’t just come out of nowhere. The global warmists were trapped into the necessity of hyping the threat by their realization that the actual evidence they had — which, let me emphasize, all hype aside, is serious, troubling and establishes in my mind the need for intensive additional research and investigation, as well as some prudential steps that would reduce CO2 emissions by enhancing fuel use efficiency and promoting alternative energy sources — was not sufficient to get the world’s governments to do what they thought needed to be done. Hyping the threat increasingly doesn’t look like an accident: it looks like it was a conscious political strategy. Now it has failed. Not everything that has come out of the IPCC and the East Anglia Climate Unit is false, but enough of their product is sufficiently tainted that these institutions can best serve the cause of fighting climate change by stepping out of the picture. New leadership might help, but everything these two agencies have done will now have to be re-checked by independent and objective sources. The global warming campaigners got into this mess because they had a deeply flawed political strategy. They were never able to develop a pragmatic approach that could reach its goals in the context of the existing international system. The global warming movement proposed a complex set of international agreements involving vast transfers of funds, intrusive regulations in national economies, and substantial changes to the domestic political economies of most countries on the planet. As it happened, the movement never got to the first step — it never got the world’s countries to agree to the necessary set of treaties, transfers and policies that would constitute, at least on paper, a program for achieving its key goals. Even if that first step had been reached, the second and third would almost surely not have been. The United States Congress is unlikely to pass the kind of legislation these agreements would require before the midterm elections, much less ratify a treaty. (It takes 67 senate votes to ratify a treaty and only 60 to overcome a filibuster.) After the midterms, with the Democrats expected to lose seats in both houses, the chance of passage would be even more remote — especially as polls show that global warming ranks at or near the bottom of most voters’ priorities. American public opinion supports ‘doing something’ about global warming, but not very much; support for specific measures and sacrifices will erode rapidly as commentators from Fox News and other conservative outlets endlessly hammer away. Without a commitment from the United States to pay its share of the $100 billion plus per year that poor countries wanted as their price for compliance, and without US participation in other aspects of the proposed global approach, the intricate global deals fall apart. Since the United States was never very likely to accept these agreements and ratify these treaties, and is even less prepared to do so in a recession with the Democrats in retreat, even “success” in Copenhagen would not have brought the global warming movement the kind of victory it sought — although it would have created a very sticky and painful political problem for the United States. But even if somehow, miraculously, the United States and all the other countries involved not only accepted the agreements but ratified them and wrote domestic legislation to incorporate them into law, it is extremely unlikely that all this activity would achieve the desired result. Countries would cheat, either because they chose to do so or because their domestic systems are so weak, so corrupt or so both that they simply wouldn’t be able to comply. Governments in countries like China and India aren’t going to stop pushing for all the economic growth they can get by any means that will work — and even if central governments decided to move on global warming, state and local authorities have agendas of their own. The examples of blatant cheating would inevitably affect compliance in other countries; it would also very likely erode what would in any case be an extremely fragile consensus in rich countries to keep forking over hundreds of billions of dollars to poor countries — many of whom would not be in anything like full compliance with their commitments. For better or worse, the global political system isn’t capable of producing the kind of result the global warming activists want. It’s like asking a jellyfish to climb a flight of stairs; you can poke and prod all you want, you can cajole and you can threaten. But you are asking for something that you just can’t get — and at the end of the day, you won’t get it. The grieving friends and relatives aren’t ready to pull the plug; in a typical, whistling-past-the-graveyard comment, the BBC first acknowledges that even if the current promises are kept, temperatures will rise above the target level of two degrees Celsius — but let’s not despair! The BBC quotes one of its own reporters: “BBC environment reporter Matt McGrath says the accord lacks teeth and does not include any clear targets on cutting emissions. But if most countries at least signal what they intend to do to cut their emissions, it will mark the first time that the UN has a comprehensive written collection of promised actions, he says.”

## alt best for climate EVEN IF it’s too late

#### !!! The alternative’s better than their strategy BECAUSE it enables best ADAPTATION EVEN IF solvency’s impossible. ONLY our role of the ballot matters in the FUTURE

Zehner 12

Green illusions,

Ozzie Zehner is the author of Green Illusions and a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley. His recent publications include public science pieces in Christian Science Monitor, The American Scholar, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, The Humanist, The Futurist, and Women’s Studies Quarterly. He has appeared on PBS, BBC, CNN, MSNBC, and regularly guest lectures at universities. Zehner’s research and projects have been covered by The Sunday Times, USA Today, WIRED, The Washington Post, Business Week and numerous other media outlets. He also serves on the editorial board of Critical Environmentalism.

Zehner primarily researches the social, political and economic conditions influencing energy policy priorities and project outcomes. His work also incorporates symbolic roles that energy technologies play within political and environmental movements. His other research interests include consumerism, urban policy, environmental governance, international human rights, and forgeries.

Zehner attended Kettering University (BS -Engineering) and The University of Amsterdam (MS/Drs – Science and Technology Studies). His research was awarded with honors at both institutions. He lives in San Francisco.

More than a few climate scientists fear it may not matter what we do to slow climate change—it may already be too late. Others believe that harms could be avoided but hold little hope that humans are capable of mobilizing the necessary changes. Even if Americans stop burning oil, coal, and natural gas, some say, the Russians, Indians, and Chinese will burn it anyway, leading to the same global outcome either way. Keeping the world below a two-degree-Celsius global temperature rise will require every signatory nation of the Copenhagen Accord to perform within the top range of their promises according to the International Energy Agency, a goal the organization's chief economist Fatih Birol claims is "too good to be believed."6 Climatologists claim we'll be lucky if sea levels rise less than two feet. They expect that in forty years the probability of experiencing a summer hotter than any yet recorded will be 10-50 percent. In eighty years the chances rise to 90 percent.7 Long before then, scientists believe that heat waves will increasingly shock crops—a single hot day can cut local agricultural yields by 7 percent. In a world with unbounded emissions, they warn, yields could decline 63—82 percent.8 Are these pessimistic outlooks justified? Perhaps. Does it mean we shouldn't bother implementing the first steps outlined in this book? Absolutely not, and here's why: In a world ravaged by climate change, these initial strategies will become not only valuable, but vital. Even if the first steps I have proposed are only partially realized (as they already are to varying degrees throughout the world), they should still prove advantageous. In a world with a rapidly changing climate, we'll be better equipped to coordinate international cooperation if we've been peacefully supporting world democracies, transparency, and the rights of workers. We'll be better prepared to deal with local calamities if our neighborhoods are more accessible by walking and biking and our civic organizations are strong. If storms ravage the world's fields, it will be easier to move crop production to lesser-quality fields if there are fewer mouths to feed. If heating or cooling our homes becomes too expensive, we'll be thankful they are well insulated and designed to make the most of the sun's energy. If members of society are unequally impacted, we'll be fortunate to have a government designed for citizens, not moneyed special interests. If it comes to making difficult choices about goods and services, we'll benefit from economies with more socially based enterprises rather than those devised to consolidate profits for distant shareholders. And when the holidays arrive, we'll be thankful we've come to appreciate the many gifts of our friends and family, even if they are not the kinds that arrive wrapped in a box. In short, the strategies we can embrace to avoid catastrophic global climate change are the same ones we'll need should the worst occur. And if those horrors don't unfurl? Well then, we'll likely be left with stronger communities, empowered women and girls, lower crime rates, cleaner air, more free time, and higher levels of happiness. Not a bad wager.

## only alt s climate

#### Framework is wrong—debate spaces should prioritize engagement in civil society in order to build momentum for social transformation—solves warming better than state engagement

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Byrne, et al., 2008.

In Peter Droege eds. Urban Energy Transition: From Fossil Fuels to Renewable Power.

Oxford, UK: Elsevier Pps.27-53.

As illustrated above, climate sustainability *cannot* succeed without robust participation by

the US. Yet, US national policy is built on inaction and delay of the type modelled above

This raises a fundamental political problem: how shall the world community interact with

American society to address the need for significant and rapid action.

Understandably, attention has been focused on US intransigence in UNFCCC treaty

negotiations. Our argument here should not be construed as, in any sense, a call for diminished

pressure on US national policy and its leadership. As we discuss below, however,

there is evidence of a sizeable and growing divide between American national policy and

civil society. This divide offers a second response to the political problem: engagement

of American communities prepared to participate in the repair of the atmospheric commons.

The politics of this strategy are merited not only by the possibility of overcoming

US national governmental inaction, but it may also more properly locate the ground and

momentum of the social change needed to halt the warming risk. As evident in the discussion

below, major reductions in CO2 emissions require community transformation.

National and international reduction targets and corresponding commitments of funds to

support social action are essential components of greenhouse politics, but these agendas can

neither embody the diversity of strategic actions needed, nor can they stand for community

will and action - the crucible of transformative change. Indeed, what we describe here as a

civil revolt against national policy underscores the incompleteness of nationally and internationally

organized politics, even when the challenge is surely global in character.

## Econ

## no war – 2nc

#### History disproves causality between crisis and war—their Lind card is wrong b/c no crisis before WW1

Ferguson 6 (Niall, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard, a Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College at Oxford, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, “The War of the World”, Penguin Books, pg. xxxviii)

Nor can economic crises explain all the violent upheavals of the century. As noted already, perhaps the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography leads from the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of war. Yet on closer inspection this pleasing story falls apart. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression became fascist regimes; nor did all the fascist regimes engage in wars of aggression. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe, but only after its economy had recovered from the Depression. The Soviet Union, which started the war on Hitler’s side, was cut off from the world economic crisis, yet ended up mobilizing and losing more soldiers than any other combatant. For the century as a whole, no general rule is discernible. Some wars came after periods of growth; others were the causes rather than the consequence of economic crisis. And some severe economic crisis did not lead to wars. Certainly, it is now impossible to argue (thought Marxists long tried to) that the First World War was the result of a crisis of capitalism; on the contrary, it abruptly terminated a period of extraordinary global economic integration with relatively high growth and low inflation.

#### No diversionary wars – prefer our evidence

Fravel, Associate Prof Poli Sci, Security Studies Program – MIT, ‘10

(M. Taylor, “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict,” *Security Studies*, 19:2, 307 – 341)

Yet despite two decades of renewed research, cumulative knowledge on diversion remains elusive. Quantitative studies contain mixed and often contradictory empirical results regarding the relationship between internal and external conflict. Some studies find a positive relationship between indicators of domestic dissatisfaction and threats or uses of force in analysis of u.s. behavior7 and in cross-national studies.8 By contrast, other research identifies a weak or nonexistent relationship between these same variables.9 Indeed, the gap between the intuition underlying diversion as a motive for conflict and existing quantitative research that Jack Levy noted in 1989 continues to characterize this research program today.10

Given the mixed empirical results in recent quantitative research, this article offers a different type of test of the diversionary hypothesis. In particular, I extend efforts to employ case study methods to test the hypothesis systematically and against alternative explanations in specific episodes of historical interest.11 Adopting a modified “most likely” approach to theory testing pioneered by Harry Eckstein, I examine two cases that should be easy for diversionary theory to explain: Argentina's 1982 seizure of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus. In these episodes, high levels of domestic political unrest preceded the escalation of salient disputes that leaders could manipulate to rally public support or demonstrate their competence as statesmen.

These cases should be homeruns for the diversionary hypothesis, but they are in fact quite difficult for it to explain. In these cases, the relationship between domestic political conflict and dispute escalation is weak at best, as the onset and magnitude of social unrest was only linked loosely with decisions to use force. Leaders' statements and reasoning provide little evidence for diversion as a central motivation for escalation. Instead, a standard realist model of international politics and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy offer a more compelling explanation of Argentine and Turkish decision making.12 Leaders in both states chose force in response to external threats to national interests, not internal threats to their political survival.

## econ 2nc

#### Their econ impact justifies imperialist lashout to remake the world in the image of market liberalization

Lipschutz ‘95, Professor of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, On Security, pg 15-17)

Consider, then, the consequences of the intersection of security policy and economics during and after the Cold War. In order to establish a “secure” global system, the United States advocated, and put into place, a global system of economic liberalism. It then underwrote, with dollars and other aid, the growth of this system.43 One consequence, of this project was the globalizations of a particular mode of production and accumulation, which relied on the re-creation, throughout the world, of the domestic political and economic environment and preferences of the United States. That such a project cannot be accomplished under conditions of really-existing capitalism is not important: the idea was that economic and political liberalism would reproduce the American self around the world.44 This would make the world safe and secure for the Untited States inasmuch as it would all be the self, so to speak. The joker in this particular deck was that efforts to reproduce some version of American society abroad, in order to make the world more secure for Americans, came to threaten the cultures and societies of the countries being transformed, making their citizens less secure. The process thereby **transformed them into the very enemies we feared so greatly**. In Iran, for example, the Shah’s efforts to create a Westernized society engendered so much domestic resistance that not only did it bring down his empire but so, for a time, seemed to pose a mortal threat to the American Empire based on Persian Gulf oil. Islamic “fundamentalism,” now characterized by some as the enemy that will replace Communism, seems to be U.S. policymakers’ worst nightmares made real,45 although without the United States to interfere in the Middle East and elsewhere, the Islamic movements might never have acquired the domestic power they now have in those countries and regions that seem so essential to American “security.” The ways in which the **framing of threats** is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and “economic security.” What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: “Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence”) shows how strategic economic interdependence – a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle – undermines the ability of states to control those technologies that, it is often argued, are critical to economic strength and military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening. (Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that *have* been imposed in recent years have all come at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.) What, then, is the solution to this “new security dilemma,” as Crawford has stylzed it? How can a state generate the conditions for legitimizing various forms of intervention into this process? Clearly, it is not enough to invoke the mantra of “competitiveness”; competition *with* someone is also critical. In Europe, notwithstanding budgetary stringencies, state sponsorship of cutting-edge technological R&D retains a certain, albeit declining, legitimacy in the United States, absent a persuasive threat, this is much less the case (although the discourse of the Clinton Administration suggests that such ideological restraints could be broken). Thus, it is the hyperrealism of Clyde Prestowitz, Karel Van Wolferen, and Michael Crichton, imagining a Japan resurgent and bent anew on (non) Pacific conquest, that provides the cultural materials for new economic policies. Can new industrialized enemies be conjured into existence so as to **justify new cold wars** and the remobilization of capital, under state direction, that must follow? Or has the world changed too much for this to happen again?

#### Turns the case—causes international backlash—makes the economy unsustainable

Higgot, 03 [Richard – Center for the Sudy Pro-Vice Chancellor for Research and Professor of International Political Economy at the University of Warwick. He was Foundation Director of the ESRC Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, “American Unilateralism, Foreign Economic Policy and the ‘Securitisation’ of Globalisation”] PDF

In a previous uni-polar moment- in the aftermath of World War Two—the USA used its unchallenged power (material and ideational) to set in place an international institutional infrastructure of global economic management. Although under written by US hegemony, the Bretton Woods System and the GAIT were multilateral in both tone and practice. For sure. the USA saw these institutions as beneficial to its national interest and its view of world order, but it defined its interests broadly and in a sufficiently inclusive manner that other countries felt able, nay keen, to sign on to a vision that stressed the importance of due process and the rule of law. Now. in another uni-polar moment. there is a strong sense that the USA is defining national interest much more narrowly, largely in security terms, and turning its back on institutional arrangements that for half a century were at the base of its more multilateral view of world order. My point here is not to make judgments on the contemporary utility of the major international institution—that they are in need of major reform is not the issue—rather I wish to capture the magnitude of the change that US policy has undergone since the advent of the Bush administration. Moreover, the notion that what is on offer here is purely an anti- American critique to be found only amongst activist NGOs and Civil Society Organisation. in the non-representative European press of marginal influence such as 7he Guardian or Le Monde or the left professoriate, needs to be quickly dispatched. In the context of what we would normally understand as neo-liberal economic globalisation. current American unilateralist foreign policy runs counter to the interests of major sections of the American politico-economic establishment. Three examples of this view from impeccably credentialed pro-American. a mid influential. sources can serve to illustrate this point. Contemporary US unilateral policy is identified and resisted by much American capitalism. It finds strong voice within the core of the Us corporate community. For example, Jeffrey Garten, Dean of the Yale Business School and a former Undersecretary for Commerce and Trade and representative of the liberal globalist wing of Us capital has gone on record as saying that this is a foreign policy harmful not only to US business in particular, but to the health of economic globalisation in general. As lie has noted (Business Week, October 14. 2002: 74-6) ‘Unilateralism imperils global economic stability'. Contemporary US unilateral policy is identified and resisted by important sections of what we might call the 'global economic managerial elite’. For example. Peter Sutherland, last director-general of the GATT, Chairman of Goldmann-Sacks, Co-Chair of the Trilateral Commission (no America-phobe he) has argued that. ‘ ..... [the USA] ..... no longer seems committed to the multilateralism ..... [it] ..... did so much to foster’ (cited in Prestowitz, 2003: 9). Contemporary US unilateral policy is identified and resisted by important sections oy the in7luential US policy wonk community. We can ignore obvious venues of democratic-minded critique from bodies such as Brookings, the Council of Foreign Relations and the Carnegie Endowment. However. it is less easy to ignore the position of think tankers such as Clyde Prestowitz. who provides a comprehensive check list of the maimer in which the USA has shifted from a multilateral to a unilateral position on a range of key foreign economic policy issues (2003: 1-17). This is an amazing book to be penned by the President of a major conservative Washington based think tank (the Economic Strategy Institute) and erstwhile prominent economic nationalist ‘Japan basher’ of the late 1980s. The thrust of Prestowitz's argument is captured in the title of his book, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions. But one significant element of the sources of critique of contemporary US foreign economic policy lies in its weakness. It currently has very little influence. The dominance of the unilateralist idealists over the policy process is to the almost complete exclusion of other voices. An ‘ideas battle’ might exist in the Us intellectual community, but it is a battle that currently takes place only on the margins of the contemporary policy process. The real battle—which is being comprehensively won by the unilateralist idealists—is the implementation battle.

## 2NC Manufacturing – Inev

#### Manufacturing can never fully rebound

Bergstrand 12 (Jeffrey Bergstrand, professor of finance at the University of Notre Dame, is an expert on international trade., 2/17/2012, "Nostalgia for factory jobs that will never come back", [www.cnn.com/2012/02/17/opinion/bergstrand-factory-nostalgia/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/17/opinion/bergstrand-factory-nostalgia/index.html))

The heyday of manufacturing, the block-long plants that produce not just tangible goods, but big, heavy ones like cars, gave us economic stability once; it can do it again. On Wednesday, President Obama spoke at the Master Lock factory in Milwaukee and said, "What's happening in Detroit can happen in other industries. What happens in Cleveland and Pittsburgh and Raleigh and Milwaukee, that's what we've got to be shooting for, is to create opportunities for hardworking Americans to get in there and start making stuff again and sending it all over the world -- products stamped with three proud words: Made in America." But as with most nostalgic visions, this one doesn't reflect economic realities. First, it's understandable why we have a romantic association with manufacturing. "Factory nostalgia" is economically legitimate, because it harkens back to the period of the greatest growth in the U.S. economy in history, basically 1950 to 1973. During that period, there was growth not just in production, but in real household incomes, which is something we have seen little of for the last 40 years. This gave rise to a burgeoning, powerful middle class, and more than that, a sense that all of America shared in the economic boom, with the assembly line tethering us like an anchor to shared prosperity. Compare this image to the more recent service-based economy. The source of the common bond -- the assembly line -- is gone. Instead, people are tied to their own education, their own human capital. Because of that, they're more stand-alone. And so since 1973, we face this widening inequality, partly because our incomes are more tied to individuals, and individuals are different. There's a huge variance across their abilities and educations, and incomes are tied directly to those things. And this situation creates the political tension we face in America; consequently, we long for manufacturing because we associate that with the strength of the middle class. But can we go back to the assembly line? To answer that, there is another important factor to keep in mind. The enormous growth from 1950-73 wasn't entirely of our own making. It was partly due to our own initiative and education, but we also must remember that in 1950, Japan, Germany, Britain and France were all leveled because of World War II. We had no competition. Today, not only are all those countries competing against us, but so are China, India and other countries in South America and Africa -- countries with very large and growing populations. It's not the same game, and in that sense, we're naïve to think we can repeat the '50s and '60s if we just pull our bootstraps up. The world was much different then. Further, there's a very important caveat to people who respond that we should just close our borders and make everything here. As an economic policy, that belief will only serve to hurt standards of living here and globally. There is a large body of evidence that shows that economic growth comes from three things: good geography, sound institutions and strong trade partnerships with the rest of the world. So, going back to closing the borders will only hurt us in the long run. Despite the recent, well-publicized successes in U.S. auto manufacturing, what is happening in the American economy is not the reversal of a trend toward declining manufacturing. Rather, it's a slowing down of the rate of loss of manufacturing, or almost a stabilization of the decline of manufacturing in this country. For the last 25 - 30 years, companies moved manufacturing to China where labor costs were considerably less and there existed an enormous consumer market. But the subsequent rapid per capita income growth in China has meant a rise in the relative price of their labor, so the cost differential is being alleviated. This cost differential is being further narrowed by China once again allowing its currency to gain in value compared to the U.S. dollar. Once that differential diminishes, the rate of manufacturing decline has to slow. However, this does not signal that "in-sourcing" or "re-shoring" is on the rise in America. Low-technology manufacturing is not anything we will ever get back to permanently. It's just too costly to produce here, and even if China becomes less attractive, there's still Latin America, and much of Asia and Africa. Going forward for decades, we simply don't have a comparative advantage in producing low-technology manufactured goods.

#### Manufacturing decline inevitable and no impact – it’s because the economy is changing not offshoring

Worstall 12 (Tim Worstall, I'm a Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London, a writer for Forbes on business and technology and strangely, one of the global experts on the metal scandium, one of the rare earths. An odd thing to be but someone does have to be such and in this flavour of our universe I am., 7/13/2012, "What Is It With This Nostalgia For Manufacturing Jobs?", [www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/07/13/what-is-it-with-this-nostalgia-for-manufacturing-jobs/](http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/07/13/what-is-it-with-this-nostalgia-for-manufacturing-jobs/))

I have to admit that I just don’t get it. Why is it that so many people are nostalgic for the days of mass employment in manufacturing? More, why is it that even generally bright and well informed people just cannot understand that those days are never coming back? Even someone like Felix Salmon just doesn’t seem to understand: US manufacturing in fact is extremely competitive on a global scale; the problem is that output has lagged productivity improvements, with the result that we’re making more stuff with ever fewer people. This is not a problem. Making more stuff with fewer people means that the people freed up can go and do something else. Run insurance exchanges for Obamacare for example. Think the basics through here. At date one we need 40 people to do the manufacturing we want to have done. At date two we need only 30 because of that rising productivity. This means we now have 10 people who can go and do something else other than manufacturing. We, as a society, are now richer by that extra production of whatever it is plus the manufactures. Requiring less human labour to do something is a good thing. Further, Salmon isn’t actually correct in his facts: There’s no particular reason why that should be the case: when manufacturers in China and Germany become more efficient, that’s their sign to employ more people, rather than fewer. As each employee becomes increasingly profitable, it makes perfect sense to keep on adding more employees. Or at least it does in some countries. In the US, by contrast, capital is cheap and plentiful, and there’s much more incentive here to replace people with capital goods wherever possible. I’m sorry but this just isn’t true. Germany has been shedding manufacturing workers as one of his own commenters shows Salmon. Also, it is not that capital is cheap in the US: it’s much cheaper in China than it is in the US at present. It is that US labour is expensive. This is also a good thing: expensive labour means that workers have high wages, rather one of the things that we’re trying to engineer in an economy. But there’s more! Manufacturing is shrinking as a portion of the economy in every country. Further, every country is shedding manufacturing jobs: yes, even China. The jobs are not being offshored to Mars, they’re being destroyed by rising productivity. It is simply true that the amount of labour we need to manufacture things is falling faster than the amount of things we want manufactured is rising. We shouldn’t be afraid of this: we should welcome it rather. For this is what has happened with agriculture over the past 300 years. We used to need 90% of the population working in the fields to feed 100% of the population. Now we use between 1 and 2% of the population to feed the 100%. We used to use 30-50% of the population working in factories to make the physical goods we wanted. Now we need under 10% (this does change depending upon country) and falling. It won’t be long, probably not in my lifetime but quite possibly in your, that working in manufacturing will be like doing so in agriculture. A slightly odd thing that some 1 or 2% of the population does. Everyone else will be in services of some kind. I’m really sorry but I simply do not understand all of these people nostalgic for some past and vanishing world. Manufacturing as a source of mass employment is just never coming back: get used to the idea.

## 2NC Jobs-Green Studies Flawed

#### A) Economic models

Meiners 11

Roger, Green Jobs Myths, John and Judy Goolsby Distinguished Professor of Economics and Law University of Texas-Arlington

http://instituteforenergypolicy.com/documents/GREEN\_JOBS\_MYTHS.pdf

As just reviewed, the green jobs literature contains highly problematic assumptions about the economics of employment. In this section we examine some of the peculiar assertions about economics in general. First, the literature rejects the existence of comparative advantage, suggesting a need to avoid trade. Second, the literature makes inappropriate calculations of consumer surplus, giving misleading results with respect to the benefits of the proposed policies. Third, the green jobs literature frequently confuses responses to mandates with market responses, improperly extrapolating from the former to predict the latter. Fourth, the literature neglects consideration of the opportunity costs of the resources it proposes to devote to green jobs programs. Opportunity costs are key to understanding the net benefit of a proposal, since the value of the alternative uses of the resources must be deducted from the gains created by the green jobs policies. Finally, green jobs analyses do not take into account how market incentives operate with respect to energy efficiency, instead using an incorrect model of behavior in which energy efficiency results only from government mandates. By failing to take into account the incentive effects on energy consumption, green jobs analyses overstate the energy that is used in the absence of proposed mandates and thereby overstate the benefits of their proposals. Using data on improved energy efficiency over past decades, we show that the market produces substantial increases in energy efficiency without the drastic measures proposed by the green jobs literature. That the literature contains so many basic economic errors is not accidental but instead reveals that much of the green jobs literature manifests a thinly concealed hostility to market ordered societies, a hostility which strongly influences its policy recommendations.268 Taken together, these flaws in economic reasoning reveal fatal flaws in the green jobs literature’s analysis of the economics of green job policies.

#### B) Double counting

Michaels and Murphy 9

Robert and Robert, Institute for Energy Research. Senior Electronics Engineer and MBA: Telecommunications and Energy Consulting at TEL-Energy. Economist Robert P. Murphy is an economist with IER specializing in climate change.

http://www.openmarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/ier-green-jobs-study-jan-2009.pdf

Double counting of jobs and overly simplistic treatment of the labor market. The green studies critiqued in this report implicitly assume that there is a limitless pool of idle labor which can fill the new “green” slots created by government spending. Yet to the extent that some of the new green jobs are filled by workers who were previously employed, estimates of job creation are overstated, perhaps significantly so. In addition, the studies do not account for the rise in worker productivity over time. Thus their long-range forecasts of total jobs created by green programs are inflated, even on their own terms. To its credit, CAP alludes to potential “inflationary labor shortages from job creation”6 due to its proposed program, but dismisses the concern as irrelevant for an economy in recession. The thinking is that the workers going into the new green jobs will simply reduce the unemployment rate, rather than siphoning talented people away from other industries. The CAP analysis ignores the fact that other industries, not favored by the green subsidies or mandates, would have been able to draw on the pool of unemployed workers as the economy recovers. With fewer workers seeking jobs, job creation in “non-green” sectors will be lower than it otherwise would have been. Moreover, some of the infrastructure plans will require a long time to implement and then reach completion. Their implementation over time could contribute to “inflationary labor shortages” once the current recession has passed.

#### Minor Impact on market

Boone 5

(PhD, Environmentalist, and Formal Intervenor in Wind Installation Hearings, “DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JON BOONE BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND”, http://www.windaction.org/?module=uploads&func=download&fileId=162, Acc: 8/2/12, og)

Very few permanent jobs will likely be created— perhaps a couple of low wage¶ maintenance employees. According to a report by the National Renewable Energy Lab on¶ windplant jobs, the national average is one maintenance employee for every 12-15¶ turbines. A 20 turbine windplant in Meyersdale, Pennsylvania now employs only two¶ maintenance employees. The claim here that four permanent jobs will be created appears¶ generous. But even if it were true, this is a very small return relative to a $40 -50 million¶ capital project.¶ 13¶ During construction, a few local security guards and some local earth moving crews may¶ be hired for a few months, while the bulk of construction will probably be completed by¶ non-local labor, since many huge turbines are actually manufactured in Europe(often as¶ subcontracts to US firms like GE) with warranties likely serviced by the manufacturer¶ and its employees. A recent study by the Iowa Department of Natural Resources on the¶ "Top of Iowa" windplant showed that, of the 200 total construction jobs, only 20 were¶ local—and all disappeared within six months.

## 2nc no gas spike

#### The POTENTIAL for spikes demonstrates the unsustainable nature of neoliberal economics—rapid supply swings occur due to over-financialization and speculation makes their impact inevitable

Oliveros ’12(Benjie, managing editor of Bulatlat, a socialist/alternative online news site, “The invisible hand of monopolies”, http://bulatlat.com/main/2012/02/27/the-invisible-hand-of-monopolies/)

Pump prices of gasoline in the US has increased by 30 percent in the last two months to reach $3.52 a gallon. (This amounts to P150.51 a gallon or P37.63 a liter, much lower than Philippine oil prices.) US consumers fear that it would reach $4 a gallon. (P171 a gallon or P42.76 a liter) And yet, demand for oil in the US is at a 15-year low. Because of low demand, oil companies have been shutting down large refineries in the US. According to a report written by Matthew Philips “Angry About High Prices, Blame Shuttered Oil Refineries,” which was published by Bloomberg Businessweek, since December, the US has lost from four to five percent of its refining capacity. However, this hardly affected the supply of oil because, according to a report “Spiking Gas Prices: GOP Sides with Big Oil Again” published by www.opposingviews.com, the number of oil drilling rigs in the US quadrupled during the last three years. The number of its working oil and gas drilling rigs topped that of the world combined. So demand for oil is low and the supply has considerably increased. The blame could not rest on increasing production costs either. In fact, according to the same report, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, BP, Chevron and Shell racked up a combined profit of $137 billion in 2011 even if they produced four percent less oil. Thus, if the demand for oil in the US is low but supply is increasing, who or what is to blame for the spike in oil prices? I could think of two reasons. First, oil, aside from gold, is the current commodity of choice for speculators. In a May 2008 article published on the website “Geopolitics – Geoeconomics,” by F William Engdahl, he said, “As much as 60% of today’s crude oil price is pure speculation driven by large trader banks and hedge funds.” He cited a June 2006 report of the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations entitled “The Role of Market Speculation in rising oil and gas prices,” which revealed that “…there is substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the large amount of speculation in the current market has significantly increased prices.” The same US Senate report also discovered that a lot of companies trading in the oil futures market are not actually producers or users of oil. Who are these speculators? The same article identified Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, as the two leading energy trading firms, as well as Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase. Speculators have been taking advantage of tensions in Syria and Iran by frantically trading in the oil futures market – the New York Mercantile Exchange for light, sweet crude and the ICE futures for Brent crude, as well as the Dubai Mercantile Exchange – thereby pushing spot prices up. This has also been the case in 2008 when speculators took advantage of the unrest in the Middle East, Sudan, Venezuela and Pakistan even if no supply shocks actually happened. Second, what we are experiencing is the invisible hand of the oil monopolies – the biggest of which are Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, and BP, with Chevron Texaco on fourth – that control the supply and dictate the prices of oil, and are the biggest winners in the spikes in oil prices. What is true in oil likewise applies in other commodities. Speculation and the invisible hand of monopolies play a major role in determining prices. Adam Smith must be turning in his grave. But mainstream economists and governments still refuse to look beyond their archaic, albeit rehashed, theories, which they label as new.

No risk of volatility – game-changers in supply and demand solve

Staple, CEO American Clean Skies Foundation, and Szydlowski, President & CEO of the Bipartisan Policy Center, March 2011

(Gregory and Norm, “TASK FORCE ON ENSURING STABLE NATURAL GAS MARKETS,” http://www.cleanskies.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/63704\_BPC\_web.pdf)

The findings and recommendations in this report reflect optimism that the robust supply horizon for natural gas presents fresh opportunities—not only to move beyond prior market concerns but **to develop new tools for managing price uncertainty**. **Fundamental changes in the domestic supply and demand balance for natural gas**, **including an unprecedented level of available storage and import capacity**, should allow markets to function more efficiently and fluidly in the future. This should create more favorable investment conditions and **significantly dampen the potential for destructive cycles of price volatility and market instability**.

Prefer our ev—consensus

Staple, CEO American Clean Skies Foundation, and Szydlowski, President & CEO of the Bipartisan Policy Center, March 2011

(Gregory and Norm, “TASK FORCE ON ENSURING STABLE NATURAL GAS MARKETS,” http://www.cleanskies.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/63704\_BPC\_web.pdf)

The Task Force on Ensuring Stable Natural Gas Markets (hereafter “Task Force”) was jointly convened by the Bipartisan Policy Center and the American Clean Skies Foundation in March 2010 to examine historic causes of instability in natural gas markets and to explore potential remedies. The membership of the Task Force is unique in its diversity and unique in the sense that it brings together key stakeholders from both sides of the supply–demand equation. Individual Task Force members are listed in the Preface; they represent natural gas **producers**, **transporters** and **distributors**, **consumer groups** and large **industrial users**, as well as **independent experts**, **consumer advocates**, **state regulatory commissions** and **environmental groups**.

Prices are fine for at least five years

Kasey, writer for The State Journal (West Virginia), 9/14/2012

(Pam, “US natural gas production on track to top 2011 record in 2012,” http://www.statejournal.com/story/19544273/us-natural-gas-production-on-track-to-top-2011-record-in-2012)

**Despite low prices**, **U.S. natural gas producers are on track in 2012 to top their record 2011 production**.

Gas produced in the first six months of 2012 came to 11.9 trillion cubic feet, or tcf, compared with 11.2 tcf in the first six months of 2011, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Total production in 2011 of 23 tcf exceeded 2010 production by 7.8 percent and topped the previous record, set in 1973, of 21.7 tcf.

**Volume has been higher in every month of 2012 compared with 2011**. The monthly average for January through June 2012 was 1.98 tcf, compared with the 2011 average of 1.92 tcf — putting the industry on track to produce 23.8 tcf this year.

Daily production has topped 65 billion cubic feet per day, or bcfd, this year, compared with 63 bcfd in 2011.

Prices dipped to a decade low below $2 per million British thermal units in April and, at under $3, **remain low**.

But industry executives have explained to The State Journal in the past that **leases typically are constructed with five-year expirations**, putting time pressure on producers and **creating a long lag in price responsiveness**. Contracts for the use of drilling rigs, often set up on an annual basis, also **make nimble response to low prices difficult**.

#### decreased demand shields a shock

Hurdle 12 (Jon Hurdle, Reporter at AOL Energy, Reporter at Reuters energy., 8/14/2012, "What is Set to Drive Natural Gas Prices Lower?", aol.com/2012/08/14/what-is-set-to-drive-natural-gas-prices-lower/)

Prices for natural gas are headed lower after a hot summer showed signs of the first boost in pricing for the fuel on which the US energy sector is increasingly relying. With the approaching end of the cooling season and continued strong supply from domestic gas producers, prices are likely to revert to their earlier trading range between $2 and $3 per million BTU, predicted Michael Lynch, president of Strategic Energy and Economic Research, a Massachusetts consultancy. New evidence on bulging US inventories of natural gas, coupled with abundant supply and the approaching end of the summer cooling season, suggests prices will resume their downward path

after a brief spike driven by power-sector demand. The amount of gas in underground storage exceeded 3,000 billion cubic feet in June, the highest ever for the month, resulting in the smallest inventory increase between April and June – when stocks begin to build ahead of the upcoming winter – since 2000, the US Energy Information Administration said. The modest increase, of only 565 bcf, was also caused by strong demand from the power sector in response to high demand for electricity to power air conditioners during an unusually hot US summer. That pushed natural gas futures prices to $3.214 per million BTU at the end of July, their highest since December last year, after hitting a decade-low of $1.907 in April. High inventory levels will persist during the "injection season" which runs from April to October, the EIA said in a report on August 8. The agency forecast gas stocks will rise to a record high of almost 4,000 bcf by Nov. 1, leaving the seasonal increase at only 1,477 bcf, the lowest since 1991. Warm Winters Mean Full Inventories Inventories were already unusually full at the start of the injection season because of reduced demand for heating gas in the exceptionally warm 2011-12 winter. That, coupled with the modest addition so far this season, has left underground storage capacity about 75 percent full, a level not normally seen until late August or early September, the EIA said. "The slow start to the injection season reflects record-high inventories at the end of this winter, leaving less space to be filled, and a large increase in natural gas use by the U.S. electric sector for power generation," the EIA said. Although the number of active drilling rigs has dropped sharply this year in response to falling dry-gas prices, production has continued to grow because of gas supply associated with more lucrative oil and liquids development, and because existing gas wells have not depleted as quickly as expected, Michael Lynch said. Despite the recent low prices, U.S. dry-gas output rose 5 percent in the first half of 2012 compared with the year-ago period, the EIA said in a separate report, citing research from Bentek Energy. The growth was largely driven by the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania and surrounding states, where production almost doubled in the 12 months to June 2012 and now contributes 9 percent of national production. Plentiful supply, coupled with high inventories and mild winter weather, resulted in price declines of up to 49 percent during the first half of 2012 compared with a year earlier, the EIA said. Although prices rebounded to the high $2 range by the end of June, they are not likely to top $3 again for the foreseeable future because of increasing production and weak residential demand growth in the sluggish economy, Lynch said. Gas at $2-3 will likely persuade more power generators to scrap old coal plants in favor of cleaner gas, but that may not be enough to buoy prices much above their current range, given record inventories and, in the short term, declining demand for air conditioning.

## competitiveness 2nc

#### Competitiveness makes environmental and economic collapse and resource wars inevitable

Bristow ’10(School of City & Regional Planning, Cardiff University) (Gillian, Resilient regions: re-‘place’ing regional competitiveness, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2010, 3, 153–167)

In recent years, regional development strategies have been subjugated to the hegemonic discourse of competitiveness, such that the ultimate objective for all regional development policy-makers and practitioners has become the creation of economic advantage through superior productivity performance, or the attraction of new ﬁrms and labour (Bristow, 2005). A major consequence is the developing ‘ubiquitiﬁcation’ of regional development strategies (Bristow, 2005; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). This reﬂects the status of competitiveness as a key discursive construct (Jessop, 2008) that has acquired hugely signiﬁcant rhetorical power for certain interests intent on reinforcing capitalist relations (Bristow, 2005; Fougner, 2006). Indeed, the competitiveness hegemony is such that many policies previously considered only indirectly relevant to unfettered economic growth tend to be hijacked in support of competitiveness agendas (for example Raco, 2008; also Dannestam, 2008). This paper will argue, however, that a particularly narrow discourse of ‘competitiveness’ has been constructed that has a number of negative connotations for the ‘resilience’ of regions. Resilience is deﬁned as the region’s ability to experience positive economic success that is socially inclusive, works within environmental limits and which can ride global economic punches (Ashby et al., 2009). As such, resilience clearly resonates with literatures on sustainability, localisation and diversiﬁcation, and the developing understanding of regions as intrinsically diverse entities with evolutionary and context-speciﬁc development trajectories (Hayter, 2004). In contrast, the dominant discourse of competitiveness is ‘placeless’ and increasingly associated with globalised, growth-ﬁrst and environmentally malign agendas (Hudson, 2005). However, this paper will argue that the relationships between competitiveness and resilience are more complex than might at ﬁrst appear. Using insights from the Cultural Political Economy (CPE) approach, which focuses on understanding the construction, development and spread of hegemonic policy discourses, the paper will argue that the dominant discourse of competitiveness used in regional development policy is narrowly constructed and is thus insensitive to contingencies of place and the more nuanced role of competition within economies. This leads to problems of resilience that can be partly overcome with the development of a more contextualised approach to competitiveness. The paper is now structured as follows. It begins by examining the developing understanding of resilience in the theorising and policy discourse around regional development. It then describes the CPE approach and utilises its framework to explain both how a narrow conception of competitiveness has come to dominate regional development policy and how resilience inter-plays in subtle and complex ways with competitiveness and its emerging critique. The paper then proceeds to illustrate what resilience means for regional development ﬁrstly, with reference to the Transition Towns concept, and then by developing a typology of regional strategies to show the different characteristics of policy approaches based on competitiveness and resilience. Regional resilience Resilience is rapidly emerging as an idea whose time has come in policy discourses around localities and regions, where it is developing widespread appeal owing to the peculiarly powerful combination of transformative pressures from below, and various catalytic, crisis-induced imperatives for change from above. It features strongly in policy discourses around environmental management and sustainable development (see Hudson, 2008a), but has also more recently emerged in relation to emergency and disaster planning with, for example ‘Regional Resilience Teams’ established in the English regions to support and co-ordinate civil protection activities around various emergency situations such as the threat of a swine ﬂu pandemic. The discourse of resilience is also taking hold in discussions around desirable local and regional development activities and strategies. The recent global ‘credit crunch’ and the accompanying in-crease in livelihood insecurity has highlighted the advantages of those local and regional economies that have greater ‘resilience’ by virtue of being less dependent upon globally footloose activities, hav-ing greater economic diversity, and/or having a de-termination to prioritise and effect more signiﬁcant structural change (Ashby et al, 2009; Larkin and Cooper, 2009). Indeed, resilience features particular strongly in the ‘grey’ literature spawned by thinktanks, consul-tancies and environmental interest groups around the consequences of the global recession, catastrophic climate change and the arrival of the era of peak oil for localities and regions with all its implications for the longevity of carbon-fuelled economies, cheap, long-distance transport and global trade. This popularly labelled ‘triple crunch’ (New Economics Foundation, 2008) has power-fully illuminated the potentially disastrous material consequences of the voracious growth imperative at the heart of neoliberalism and competitiveness, both in the form of resource constraints (especially food security) and in the inability of the current system to manage global ﬁnancial and ecological sustainability. In so doing, it appears to be galvinising previously disparate, fractured debates about the merits of the current system, and challenging public and political opinion to develop a new, global concern with frugality, egalitarianism and localism (see, for example Jackson, 2009; New Economics Foundation, 2008).

#### Causes trade wars and protectionism—turns their offense

Krugman ‘94,PhD (Paul, Nobel Prize winning Economist, Professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Centenary Professor at the London School of Economics, and an op-ed columnist for The New York Times) March/April Foreign Affairs “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession” l/n

A much more serious risk is that the obsession with competitiveness will lead to trade conflict, perhaps even to a world trade war. Most of those who have preached the doctrine of competitiveness have not been old-fashioned protectionists. They want their countries to win the global trade game, not drop out. But what if, despite its best efforts, a country does not seem to be winning, or lacks confidence that it can? Then the competitive diagnosis inevitably suggests that to close the borders is better than to risk having foreigners take away high-wage jobs and high-value sectors. At the very least, the focus on the supposedly competitive nature of international economic relations greases the rails for those who want confrontational if not frankly protectionist policies. We can already see this process at work, in both the United States and Europe. In the United States, it was remarkable how quickly the sophisticated interventionist arguments advanced by Laura Tyson in her published work gave way to the simple-minded claim by U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor that Japan's bilateral trade surplus was costing the United States millions of jobs. And the trade rhetoric of President Clinton, who stresses the supposed creation of high-wage jobs rather than the gains from specialization, left his administration in a weak position when it tried to argue with the claims of NAFTA foes that competition from cheap Mexican labor will destroy the U.S. manufacturing base.

# 1NR

## overview

#### Their 1ac lind article agrees with us, proves we link turn trade and growth which are collapsing now, and is a DA to the permutation

Lind, New America Foundation Economic Growth Program Policy Director, 5/11/2010

[Michael, "Will the great recession lead to World War IV?," http://www.salon.com/news/economics/index.html?story=/opinion/feature/2010/05/11/great\_recession\_world\_war\_iv]

If history is any guide, an era of global economic stagnation will help the nationalist and populist right, at the expense of the neoliberal and cosmopolitan/multicultural left. During the Long Depression of the late 19th century, which some historians claim lasted from 1873 to 1896, the nations of the West adopted protectionist measures to promote their industries. Beginning with Bismarck’s Germany, many countries also adopted social reforms like government pensions and health insurance. These reforms were often favored by the nationalist right, as a way of luring the working class away from the temptations of Marxism and left-liberalism. By and large the strategy worked. When World War I broke out, the working classes and farmers in most countries rallied enthusiastically around their respective flags. The Great Depression of the 1930s similarly led to the rise of one or another version of the authoritarian, nationalist right in Europe. Only in a few societies with deeply established liberal traditions, like the English-speaking countries and Scandinavia, did liberals or liberal conservatives hold on. And Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal Democratic Party, a coalition that included racist Southerners and traditionalist Catholic immigrants, was not particularly liberal by today’s standards. In both eras of depression, great-power rivalry for resources and markets intensified and ultimately led to a world war. Following World War II, the U.S. sought to avert a repetition of that pattern, by creating a global market secured by a global great-power concert in the form of the Security Council. But the project of economic disarmament and security cooperation broke down almost immediately after 1945 and the split between the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans produced the Cold War. The second attempt at a global market that began after the Cold War may be breaking down now, as the most important economic powers pursue their conflicting national interests. A functioning global market system can work only if its members abandon mercantilism -- the policy of trying to enjoy perpetual trade surpluses, by fair means or foul. However, the nations with the three largest economies after the U.S. -- China, Japan and Germany -- all want to enjoy never-ending merchandise trade surpluses. All three have used "currency mercantilism" to help their export industries, to the detriment of the global economic system. China and Japan, by different methods, have deliberately undervalued their currencies, to help their exports and keep imports out of their markets. Germany accomplished something similar, by persuading its trade partners to give up independent currencies that they were able to revalue for the crippling straitjacket of the euro. The system worked only as long as Americans borrowed to pay for imports from Japan and China, while southern Europeans borrowed to pay for imports from Germany. But the consumers are tapped out and neither Americans nor southern Europeans are in a mood for austerity measures in the middle of a near-depression. Unless the Chinese, Japanese and Germans turn into credit-happy consumer societies the global economy may be in for prolonged stagnation. Instead of changing their ways, however, the surplus countries are denouncing their own customers for their profligacy in buying their goods and insisting that the same customers be penalized by austerity programs. This will not end happily. As the oversold promise of free-market globalization fades, countries large and small may turn increasingly toward state capitalism. At home, this would mean permanent state support of troubled industries like banking and the automobile industries, which all of the major industrial countries have bailed out. In trade, this would mean a retreat from global trade areas toward regional blocs and bilateral deals. Examples include agreements between energy-hungry governments like those of China and Japan and the state-owned oil or natural gas companies of Saudi Arabia and Russia. In a world of diplomatic rivalries among great powers to win contracts with state-owned corporations, the distinctions between geoeconomics and geopolitics would erode, with potentially dangerous consequences. Direct war between great powers seems unlikely, but if the Cold War was World War III, then a cold World War IV resembling Orwell’s shifting coalitions of Eurasia, Eastasia and Oceania in 1984 is all too easy to imagine.

#### Tax credits get coopted by unsustainable speculation—collapses the industry

Green 9

Joshua Green, The Atlantic, 2009, The Elusive Green Economy, [www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/07/the-elusive-green-economy/307554/](http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/07/the-elusive-green-economy/307554/)

The trouble with tax credits is that in order to make use of them, you must owe taxes, and most start-ups struggling toward profitability do not. So while a company looking to build a wind or solar facility would qualify for valuable benefits, it had no means of realizing this “tax equity.” The work-around was to partner with someone who did, someone large enough to finance a $500 million facility and profitable enough to incur a large tax bill. Having witnessed two decades of busts and bankruptcies, traditional U.S. banks wanted no part of this. European banks, going by their more positive experience, were comfortable funding large renewable projects, but didn’t qualify for U.S. tax credits. The perversity of the government’s incentives demanded a big balance sheet, huge profits, and an indifference to risk. Enter Wall Street.

Investment banks and hedge funds stepped in to fill the void, engineering tax-equity vehicles with suspiciously complicated-sounding names, like “partnership flip structure” and “inverted passthrough lease,” to exploit the tax benefits. These deals amounted to financing agreements for large infrastructure projects, given in exchange for tax credits, often worth hundreds of millions of dollars, that could be applied against profits earned primarily on other investments (like mortgage-backed securities). For renewable-energy companies, tax-equity deals meant life or death: the combination of credits could offset two-thirds of the capital cost of a project. Companies like Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, and AIG became an integral part—even the integral part—of the renewables industry, because the utility-scale projects they financed produce the overwhelming majority of clean energy in the United States.

Basing the entire system of federal incentives on tax equity had two weaknesses, one that has always been clear and another that became clear only recently. Forcing renewables companies to route government support through Wall Street, thereby sacrificing a portion of it, was needless and inefficient. But it also tied the industry’s fate to that of the financial world’s most aggressive players. Just as Wall Street bankers bet that housing prices could never fall and got wiped out when proved wrong, Congress seems never to have imagined that Wall Street might someday have no profits and need no tax equity. Early last year, the multibillion-dollar tax-equity universe consisted of 18 providers. After September’s record carnage, the number dropped to four. Credit froze, and most projects ground to a halt. All of a sudden, not just a few start-ups but the entire renewable-energy industry was staring into the Valley of Death.

#### The system kills agency and value to life

Giroux 11

Henry A. Giroux English and Cultural Studies Department, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada, 2011 "Neoliberalism and the death of the social state: remembering Walter Benjamin's Angel of History," Social Identities, Vol. 17, No. 4, July 2011, 587-601

As history is erased and economics becomes the driving force for all aspects of political, cultural, and social life, those institutional and political forces that hold the reins of power now become the purveyors of social death, comfortably ensconced in a political imaginary that wreaks human misery on the planet as the rich and powerful reap huge financial gains for themselves. The principal players of casino capitalism live in the highly circumscribed time of short-term investments and financial gains and are more than willing to close their eyes to the carnage and suffering all around them while they are sucked into the black hole of the future. As the social state is eviscerated by an all-embracing market fundamentalism, society increasingly becomes a machine for destroying the power of civic culture and civic life, proliferating the ideologies and technologies of what is increasingly and unequivocally becoming a punishing state. And, quoting Achille Mbembe (2003), politics becomes a form of social death in which 'the future is collapsed into the present' (p. 37).

## rob

#### Only risk of a link turn—tech fixes create scientific authoritarianism—only the alt enables deliberative citizenship

Byrne and Toly 6

<http://seedconsortium.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/45925604/Byrne_etal.pdf>

Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Established in 1980 at the University of Delaware, the Center is a leading institution for interdisciplinary graduate education, research, and advocacy in energy and environmental policy. CEEP is led by Dr. John Byrne, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University. For his contributions to Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since 1992, he shares the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize with the Panel's authors and review editors.

The Technique of Modern Energy Governance While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul, 1964: 133 – 146) replaces critical thinking about modern life with an awed sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality. From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar, technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy’s social project. As one observer has noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the “great paradox of the technological mystique [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical expertise.” Even the vanguard of a sustainable energy transition seems swayed by the magnetism of technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics. Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford (1964). Governance “by the people” consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its operations. Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford suggests (1964: 1) that the classical idea of democracy includes “a group of related ideas and practices... [including] communal self-government... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that affects the whole community.” Modern conventional and sustainable energy strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being recognized as the emblems of modernist politics. As a result, modernist democratic practice becomes imbued with an authoritarian quality, which “deliberately eliminates the whole human personality, ignores the historic process, [and] overplays the role of abstract intelligence, and makes control over physical nature, ultimately control over man himself, the chief purpose of existence” (Mumford, 1964: 5). Meaningful democratic governance is willingly sacrificed for an energy transition that is regarded as scientifically and technologically unassailable.

## at: prag

#### Pragmatism is an illusion – if we win SUSTAINABILITY, they’re the ones who have no strategy and the alt is “what works best”

Blackwater 12

<http://monthlyreview.org/2012/06/01/the-denialism-of-progressive-environmentalists>

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Conclusion: Calling Out Crackpot Realism The supposed trump card of Nordhaus and Shellenberger, and all such progressive environmentalists, is their purported realism. In practice this is simple conformity with the interests of the dominant economic and political power structures of the day. This means acceding to the related imperatives of financialized capitalism: accepting that both opportunities for growth be continually expanded, and that the self-identification of the electorate as materialistic consumers be fostered and pandered to—even if that means occluding the grounds for collective action. It is in these terms that they attempt to redefine environmentalism, and in the process disparage the efforts of all environmentalists whose arguments pose uncomfortable challenges to the status quo. They characterize all who are not with them as utopians, for them the ultimate in damning with faint praise. Mixed into the realism of the progressive environmentalist is a love of power. It stands to reason, they believe, that anyone who does not work within the terms set by the powerful will never share in power, and is therefore a fool. They regard the green movement as a whole precisely as the wider New Democrat/New Labour mentality regards the left as a whole: well-meaning, woolly, oppositionalist, self-indulgent, self-defeating, and pathetic. Ideologically pure the others may be; yet if they sincerely cared about the interests they said they were fighting for, they ought to fall into line, however much they might detest it, behind the realists who might actually wield some practical influence. There is no alternative. At other times less crude versions of this doctrine, especially ones which promised real hope of reforming the system from within and of gaining power to change power, have had much to recommend them; this is the foundation for the historic successes of social democracy. But things are different now. Above all, in this context, environmental limits preclude continuation of the status quo. Progressive environmentalists pride themselves on their realism and in being intimates of the power structures of the present. However, those same structures are doomed to collapse, and belief in them is only sustained by denial, so this realism is in fact the very height of fantasy—“crackpot realism,” to adapt the phrase C. Wright Mills used to describe the mentality of the Cold War.12 The strategy for those who wish to reply to Nordhaus and Shellenberger and to marginalize them as spokesmen for the environmental movement ought to be clear—turn the tables on them by emphasizing the self-contradictions, simplistic fantasy, and the sheer insubstantiality of their thought. And to emphasize the important fact: it is too late to play games.

## alt

#### Epistemology—the cult of productionism CROWDS OUT other options through insistence on POLICY

Zehner 12

Green illusions,

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Perhaps it's all too easy for us to miss the limitations of alternative energy as we drop to our knees at the foot of the clean energy spectacle, gasping in rapture. The spectacle has become a divine deity around which duty-bound citizens gravitate to chant objectives without always reflecting upon fundamental goals. This oracle conveys a ready-made creed of ideals, objectives, and concepts that are convenient to recite. And so these handy notions inevitably become the content of environmental discourse. In a process of self-fashioning, environmentalists offer their arms to the productivist tattoo artist to embroider wind, solar, and biofuels into the subcutaneous flesh of the movement. These novelties come to define what it means to be an environmentalist.1 Environmentalists aren't the only ones lining up for ink. Peer pressure is a formidable power, and there's no reason to assume that rational adults are above its dealings. Every news article, environmental protest, congressional committee hearing, textbook entry, and bumper sticker creates an occasion for the visibility of solar cells, wind power, and other productivist technologies. Numerous actors draw upon these moments of visibility to articulate paths these technologies ought to follow.2 First, diverse groups draw upon flexible clean-energy definitions to attract support. Then they roughly sculpt energy options into more appealing promises—not through experimentation, but by planning, rehearsing, and staging demonstrations. Next, lobbyists, strategic planners, and pr teams transfer the promises into legislative and legal frameworks and eventually into necessities for engineers to pursue. A consequence of this visibility-making is the necessary invisibility of other options. There's only so much room on the stage.

## perm

#### Don’t believe their solvency claims—it’s locked into a narrative of technological determinism that creates a religious obsession with wind—makes resistance impossible

Byrne and Toly 6

<http://seedconsortium.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/45925604/Byrne_etal.pdf>

Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Established in 1980 at the University of Delaware, the Center is a leading institution for interdisciplinary graduate education, research, and advocacy in energy and environmental policy. CEEP is led by Dr. John Byrne, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University. For his contributions to Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since 1992, he shares the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize with the Panel's authors and review editors.

Wind enthusiasts also appear to be largely untroubled by trends toward larger and larger turbines and farms, the necessity of more exotic materials to achieve results, and the advancing complications of catching the wind. There is nothing new about these sorts of trends in the modern period. The trajectory of change in a myriad of human activities follows this pattern. Nor is a critique per se intended in an observation of this trend. Rather, the question we wish to raise is whether another feature in this pattern will likewise be replicated—namely, a “technological mystique” (Bazin, 1986) in which social life finds its inspiration and hope in technical acumen and searches for fulfillment in the ideals of technique (Mumford, 1934; Ellul, 1964; Marcuse, 1964; Winner, 1977, 1986; Vanderburg, 2005). This prospect is not a distant one, as a popular magazine recently illustrated. In a special section devoted to thinking “After Oil,” National Geographic approvingly compared the latest wind technology to a well-known monument, the Statue of Liberty, and noted that the new machines tower more than 400 feet above this symbol (Parfit, 2005: 15 - 16). It was not hard to extrapolate from the story the message of Big Wind’s liberatory potential. Popular Science also commended new wind systems as technological marvels, repeating the theme that, with its elevation in height and complexity lending the technology greater status, wind can now be taken seriously by scientists and engineers (Tompkins, 2005). A recent issue of The Economist (2005) included an article on the wonder of electricity generated by an artificial tornado in which wind is technologically spun to high velocities in a building equipped with a giant turbine to convert the energy into electricity. Indeed, wind is being contemplated as a rival able to serve society by the sheer technical prowess that has often been a defining characteristic of modern energy systems. Obviously, wind energy has a long way to go before it can claim to have dethroned conventional energy’s “technological cathedrals” (Weinberg, 1985). But its mission seems largely to supplant other spectacular methods of generating electricity with its own. The politics supporting its rapid rise express no qualms about endorsing the inevitability of its victories on technical grounds. In fact, Big Wind appears to seek monumental status in the psyche of ecologically modern society. A recent alliance of the American Wind Energy Association and the U.S. electric utility industry to champion national (subsidized) investment in higher voltage transmission lines (to deliver green-and-cheap electricity), illustrates the desire of Big Wind to plug into Giant Power’s hardware and, correspondingly, its ideology (see American Wind Energy Association, 2005, supporting “Transmission Infrastructure Modernization”). The transformative features of such a politics are unclear. Indeed, wind power—if it can continue to be harvested by everlarger machines—may penetrate the conventional energy order so successfully that it will diffuse, without perceptible disruption, to the regime. The air will be cleaner but the source of this achievement will be duly noted: science will have triumphed still again in wresting from stingy nature the resources that a wealthy life has grown to expect. Social transformation to achieve sustainability may actually be unnecessary by this political view of things, as middle-class existence is assured via clean, low-cost and easy-to-plug-in wind power.